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THE CRISIS OF CULTURE IN THE ERA OF MASS-DEMOCRACIES AND AUTARCHIES¹

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THE leading idea of this lecture is that in the present social situation the existence of culture is threatened from two sides. It is exposed to certain dangers if, in conformity to the principles of liberalism and freedom, the social forces in a democratic mass-society are left to operate without any kind of guiding or regulating outside interference. It is exposed to greater dangers still if, in this mass-society, the forms of dictatorship supplant the forms of freedom. To these two assertions I would add a third, namely, that the very same sociological causes which engender cultural disintegration in a free, liberal society, themselves prepare the ground for the dictatorial forms of culture.

These assertions, however, which we have placed in the forefront of this discussion, acquire a scientific import, and can be of real help to the politician who is interested in and cares for culture only if, unlike Spengler, for instance, we do not simply talk in general terms about the ominous signs of cultural decline but are also able accurately to dis-

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tinguish and analyse each separate social force that is a potential cause of cultural disintegration and destruction.

Our task, therefore, is not to engage in prophecies but to find a clue to the systematic study of the fundamental social factors in their bearing on culture. Implicit in this is the view that cultural crises are very largely occasioned by sociological causes, though this causal connexion has hitherto received exceedingly little attention. Yet a careful study will show that the existence of culture is subject to certain vital social pre-conditions, in the same way as are the prevalence of crime, the fertility of a population, the proper functioning of an economy, the working of certain Constitutions, etc. We must first, therefore, obtain a clear insight into the nature of these social pre-conditions, and then, equipped with this knowledge, we shall proceed to a diagnosis of the problem before us.

Any discussion of the social conditions on which the existence of culture hinges must be split up into two main sections.¹ For the social element penetrates into the sphere of culture in two diverse forms.

Firstly, in the form of social organizations ; i.e. in the *form of institutions*. Consider, in this connexion, the influence which churches, schools, universities, academies and research committees, broadcasting, and all kinds of propaganda organizations exercise on the spiritual life of a community.

Secondly, the effect of the social element can also be studied where, through its spontaneous movements, non-

¹ In this paper I am consciously refraining from discussing the economic-structural pre-conditions of cultural life, nor, therefore, shall I touch upon the social consequences that flow from the present economic structure and economic crisis. The exclusion of this aspect from the present discussion is due solely to shortage of space and not in any way to an under-estimate of the complex problems to which it gives rise. On the other hand, however, I think the time has come to work out in detail those connexions of cause and effect in the social process which, apart from economic factors, exert a determining influence on cultural life ; moreover, it is only by means of the intermediate link which those connexions constitute that one is enabled clearly to understand the ultimate social effects of economic processes.

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organized social life reacts upon spiritual and cultural life. An enquiry into the functioning of the modern *laissez-faire* liberal mass-society must, clearly, draw attention to the regularities and spontaneous processes peculiar to a non-organized social structure, whilst in an analysis of a mass-society under dictatorial government one must be acquainted with the characteristic sociological effects which institutionalization produces on culture. In the first part of this paper, therefore, I shall endeavour to give an accurate account of the impact of an unregulated *laissez-faire* society on culture ; whilst in the second part I shall be concerned to indicate the consequences that flow from a complete institutionalization of cultural life, *from planning in the sphere of culture*.

Now it would, of course, be possible to devote the whole of this essay to a minute analysis of one single component factor of this vast and complex problem. Since, however, this paper is in a certain sense intended to be programmatical in character, it seems preferable that, rather than venture upon such a refined partial analysis, I should—somewhat hurriedly—sketch the whole problem of cultural disruption and point to the numerous approaches from which a sociological explanation of it is feasible.

I start, then, with a sociological description of the free-living social structure, and shall observe the manner of its functioning with particular reference to the rise and growth of culture. At first sight, indeed, such a non-organized social life seems a haphazard, inarticulate complex. But closer examination reveals that here, too, exactly the same processes are operative as, for instance, in a freely competitive economy. The difference is merely that in the case of the production of culture these processes must be studied in a different way and according to different criteria. A sociological discussion of culture in the liberal, non-authoritarian society must examine the forces operative there from two angles of approach. Firstly, from the standpoint of the

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sociology of the *intellectual layer*, the intelligentsia, which is the direct producer of culture ; secondly, from the standpoint of the *embedment of this stratum in the totality of society*.

Every sociology of culture must set out from a *sociology of this stratum of intellectuals*.¹ Viewed from the standpoint of sociology the function of these élites is to produce different patterns of culture in the various spheres of social life. We can distinguish the following main types of élites : the political, the organizing,² the scholastic, and the artistically religious élites. Whereas the political and organizing élites are primarily concerned to effect an integration of the numerous wills, the scholastic, contemplative, æsthetical, and

¹ On the problem of the intelligentsia there is in several countries a very extensive range of literature, in which the problem is treated from several angles of approach and according to its particular relation to the social situation of the intelligentsia prevailing in each of those countries. The problem was probably first discussed in Czarist Russia, whence also the term "intelligentsia" derives. Here we need refer only to : Laurou, *Historische Briefe* ; Mihailovsky, *Collected Essays* (Russian) ; Ovesianiko-Kulikovsky, *History of the Russian Intelligentsia*. For these references I am indebted to Mr. M. M. Postan of the London School of Economics. Very important for the understanding of the whole question of the intelligentsia are the writings of Vilfredo Pareto, of which I am here citing the French editions, *Traité de Sociologie générale*, Paris-Lausanne, 1917 ; cf. there, in the "Table analytique des matières," the references to "Classes sociales ou castes," especially "Élites et leur circulation." Cf. further his *Les Systèmes socialistes*, Paris, 1926 ; cf. especially references under the headings : "Aristocracies," "Persistance des mêmes phénomènes sociaux," and "Formation d'une aristocratie dans une société égalitaire." Apart from the works of Pareto, the discussion was stimulated in France by Maurras, Ch., *L'avenir de l'Intelligence*, and was then pursued on a broader basis in the form given to the question by Benda, J., in his books, *La Trahison des clercs* and *La Fin de l'Éternel*. For the French treatment of the problem cf. further : Furlan, L., *La Circulation des élites*, Paris, 1911 ; Maurois, de, *Les Classes dirigeantes, Noblesse, Aristocratie, Élite*, Paris, 1910 ; Rousieres, Paul de, *L'élite dans la société moderne, son rôle*, Paris, 1914.

For the German discussion cf. Mannheim, K., *Ideologie und Utopie*, 2nd ed., 1930, pp. 121-34. For the discussion connected with the subject-matter of those pages, cf. the bibliography at the end of my article on "Wissens-soziologie" in the *Handwörterbuch der Soziologie*, ed. Vierkandt. Cf. further Speier, H., *Zur Soziologie der bürgerlichen Intelligenz, Gesellschaft*, 1929. Since the time of this discussion I have treated the whole problem again in a detailed, but as yet unpublished, analysis of the Intelligentsia. In the present paper I am endeavouring to reproduce some thoughts from that work.

² Of the literature on those élites whose importance to-day is constantly increasing, I shall here cite only the following : Marsal, F. : "Les élites industrielles et financières," *Revue de Paris*, (19) ; (5), 19, I. x. 29 ; Delaisi, *La Démocratie et les financiers*, Paris, 1910, and cf. especially : Max Weber : *Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft*, pt. III., ch. 6, *Bürokratie*.

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religious élites are able to bring about the spiritual sublimation of those surplus energies of which, in the direct day-to-day struggle for existence, society does not make full use. Thus the last-named élites stimulate cognition, introversion, contemplation, and reflection which, necessary as they are for any society, would not emerge spontaneously.

Into the complicated psychological question of sublimation, introversion, contemplation, etc., we cannot here enquire. Among the factors which tend to stimulate cultural sublimation, two are of particular importance. Firstly, the average amount of leisure¹ which the members of a society enjoy; and secondly, the way in which its intelligentsia—which has more leisure than the other social strata and whose mode of life differs from that of the rest of society—is recruited. Even in a mass-democracy, cultural sublimation, as in art and fashion, for instance, can take place only if small groups of taste-creating connoisseurs have previously come into being, from whom that sublimation and the technique of sublimation slowly radiates through the rest of society. If these small groups are destroyed, or if obstacles are placed in the way of their proper selection, then, even under otherwise entirely favourable social conditions, no culture can be created. The crisis of culture in the liberal democracy is attributable, in the first instance, to the fact that the selection of these élites and the closed or open forms assumed by these groups becomes progressively more and more unfavourable, and that the unguided life of society in a mass-democracy begins, after a certain lapse of time, to function adversely from the standpoint of the creation of culture. We can observe, in the case of the principle of free competition, that that principle tends, under certain circumstances, in the direction of a maximum of achievement on the part of individual competitors, who vie with one

¹ On the problem of leisure cf. *inter alia* Veblen, Th., *The Theory of the Leisure Class*, 1st ed., 1899; Lloyd, "Ages of Leisure," *Amer. Journ. of Sociol.*, vol. XXVIII, 1922-3; Hammond, J. L., *The Growth of Common Enjoyment* (Hobhouse Memorial Trust Lectures, No. 3), 1933.

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another for qualitative excellence, whereas under different conditions the very same principle functions harmfully in that it degenerates to competition by ignoble means. So also, in the case of other social forces, there are combinations of circumstances under which the self-regulating process of social production leads to negative results in the spiritual sphere.

Henceforth, I shall designate as negative Liberalism or negative Democracy those cases where the very same sociological processes which, left to themselves, functioned positively in the earlier stages of Democracy and Liberalism, lead to negative results in the stage of mass-society. There are four such cases to which reference must be made :

1. The increasing number of élite groups and its consequences.
2. The destruction of the exclusiveness of the élite groups.
3. The change in the principle of the selection of these élites.
4. The change in the inward composition of the élites.

1. In a mass-society the *number of élites* increases. More and more social strata are enabled to produce élites from among their midst. Every élite group creates norms and tastes different from those of the other élites. This fact is sufficiently accounted for by the principle of social competition. At first the growth in the number of leading élites exercises a most beneficent effect on society. It produces a polymorphism in contrast to the rigidity of the older traditional society. But this polymorphism of groups and norms makes for confusion when their number becomes excessively large. The result then is that the many élites and norms mutually neutralize the effects and impressions which they respectively produce, and this in its turn must necessarily lessen the importance of their leadership. The old traditional society was plastic and clear, because in each of its various spheres there were only one or two élites which

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combated each other. Modern mass-society becomes un-plastic and devoid of leadership because it contains too many leading groups with too many conflicting and diverging norms.

2. In the democratized mass-society the exclusiveness of the élite groups is destroyed, since in that society it is becoming increasingly easy for everybody to gain access to all spheres of social activity. If this necessary minimum of exclusiveness is lacking, then the evolution of taste, of a dominant principle of style, and the formation of a purpose that is conscious of its aim are impossible. The new impulses are snapped up by the indiscriminate masses just as impulses, that is, in their still immature form, and then flicker away like all the other stimuli that flit about in the crowd. This is the sociological cause of the symptom, discovered already at the beginning of this century by the famous historian of art, Riegl that since the 1840s we no longer possess a genuine style of our own in art, but feed on old styles which we merely reproduce in consecutive order at a somewhat rapid rate. The same predicament of a general lack of resolution and guidance is, however, to be met with in other spheres also; in such spheres, for instance, as the philosophical interpretation of life, the moral judgment of values and political decisions. This general uncertainty, which surrounds all æsthetic, moral, and political judgments, itself provokes the reaction of dictatorial solutions. The majority of individuals cannot bear this large variety of possible viewpoints and opinions, and they therefore long for some form of resolute leadership. The fact that the pro-dictatorship parties could—to the bewildering surprise of many people—attain their ends without encountering the slightest opposition or resistance from any of the other groups, is to be attributed solely to the numerousness and diversity of opinions in democratic society, which obstructed the taking of unequivocal decisions. Here we have another instance of how, in the era of democratic mass-society, the pure

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and freely functioning liberal mechanism can suddenly operate negatively and thereby pave the way for its own destruction.

3. A further source of negative democratization in the unguided *laissez-faire* mass-society lies in the changes that have recently taken place in the *manner of selecting these élites*. If, on the one hand, we have seen that the preservation by these élites of a relative seclusion and exclusiveness is essential to their cultural fertility, it is, on the other hand, important that both the influx of individuals into these leading groups and the process of their selection from among the Great Society should be suitably regulated. True, the esoteric cultures of the priesthoods of Babylon and Egypt are proof that caste-like closed groups of intellectuals can create a cultural life, nay, even an over-refinement of culture.¹ But precisely on account of this social in-breeding they tend very soon to become torpid. This explains why a certain measure of accessibility to and openness of these élite groups is, equally with the afore-mentioned exclusiveness, a precondition of genuine cultural vitality. For every individual who comes to an élite from different surroundings brings with him new ideas, new stimuli, and new impulses which enrich its inner atmosphere. Moreover, he also facilitates the establishment of contacts between it and the wider groups to which all élites have to turn. But even in this sphere, so far as concerns the principle of selection, we can discern the appearance of symptoms in the democratic mass-society which reflect the negative functioning of the unguided social organism. For if we recall the main forms of social selection that have hitherto existed, we see that three different forms or principles of selection can be distinguished, namely, selection on the basis of blood, selection on the

¹ On the rôle of the intellectuals in the older, non-European civilizations cf. *inter alia* the writings of Max Weber: *Gesammelte Aufsätze zur Religions-soziologie*, vol. I (China), pp. 276-536; vol. II, pp. 134-250 ("Intelligenz im alten Indien"); vol. III, "Das antike Judentum," *passim*. Cf. also the section on "Stände, Klassen und Religion" in his *Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft*, pt. II, ch. 4, *Grundriss der Sozialökonomik*, vol. III.

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basis of property, and selection on the basis of achievement. Aristocratic society, especially after it had entrenched and stabilized itself, chose its élites primarily on the blood basis. Bourgeois society supplemented this to a very great extent by the principle of selection according to the ownership of property and wealth. This principle affected also the recruitment of the intellectual strata, since certain obstacles and difficulties—such as prolonged study and delay in earning a living—were placed in the way of acquiring an education, so that culture was essentially the privileged monopoly of the well-to-do few. Only in the latest phase of development does the principle of selection on the basis of achievement appear side by side with the two older principles. The élites in our bourgeois society are a mixture of these three principles. Certain positions are still reserved, as of right, for the nobility. Other posts are filled from among the higher ranks of society, since the type of education requisite for the work they involve can be enjoyed only by the rich. In the lower strata, finally, a man's claim to recognition and advancement is coming to rest more and more on his own effort and achievement. Whatever we may think of this composite apparatus of selection from the standpoint of social justice, we must concede that it has one merit. It ingeniously combines the conservative and the progressive forms of selection; for, clearly, the principle of effort embodies the ambitions of the forward-striving elements in society, whereas, on the other hand, the first two bases of recruitment are meant to serve as guarantees for the more gradual change of the traditional forces and influences. We have no clear idea as to how the selection of élites would function in an open mass-society where achievement and individual exertion are to be the sole basis of selection. It is possible that the problem facing such a society might lie in this, that, owing to the quick tempo in which it changed its élites, its growth and expansion would lack a background of social continuity. The big danger to culture in our mass-

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society, however, seems to lie, not in the principle of achievement suddenly becoming the general basis of selection and therefore lacking, as it were, a social brake, but rather in the fact that, in their competitive struggle for power, individual groups in our society promise, as a reward for their followers in the social conflict, to drop the principle of selection on the basis of achievement and suddenly establish the blood, racial, and other criteria by which it is intended to thwart the principle of achievement. It is unnecessary to expatiate on the fact that this recently proclaimed blood and racial principle is, curiously enough, not a genuine blood principle at all, since it is not, as in a former age, meant to preserve the existence and traditions of aristocratic racial minorities, but is "democratic" in that it seeks to guarantee to the indiscriminate masses the privilege of effortless elevation. Hitherto it had been the often envied privilege of nobles that they could lay claim to certain functions and positions primarily on the ground of their aristocratic origin, whilst considerations of effort or achievement were of only secondary importance. Now, however, the pettiest individual in his own group is to have the advantage that not his achievement but his extraction entitles him to privilege. Here again, we have a characteristic instance of the process we called "negative democratization." Whereas in the first phase of modern society the principle of freedom and free competition served to proclaim the universal equality of human beings, and tended in the direction of an equitable adjustment of identical rights and duties, the same principle, in the example before us, takes a different form. The principle of democratic equality is henceforth to be construed to mean that everybody is privileged, and that the "man in the street," also, is to enjoy the privilege of kinship with the "pure" race, which relieves him from the obligation to individual exertion. That in the long run it is logically impossible for everybody to be privileged does not matter in the least, since in this negatively-functioning

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competition of ideas questions of rightness or wrongness, plausibility or absurdity are ruled out. But what is to become of a mass-society if it sets even the principle of effort and achievement aside—the principle which originally constituted its novelty and which it played off against the principle of tradition—it is quite impossible to foresee.

4. A further source of social disturbances to cultural productivity in the latest phase of development is the fact that the *composition of these élites* is artificially disarranged, especially as regards the participation of the *autochthonous* and *mobile* elements.¹ In order, however, to understand the significance of these changes, it must be remembered that our Western culture has from the very beginning been a mixture of local carriers of culture, who belonged to provinces and estates, and of intellectuals who were not tied to any fixed place. Since the antecedents of our culture lie in clerical education, a large element of internationalism has from the outset penetrated into it. Clerical education was primarily the expression of an international texture, and only secondarily did it embody the differences arising from particular local and national situations. The secular successor of this Christian humanism was secular humanism, which in its turn again created an international culture resting on a temporal foundation. But already here, in the ranks of these humanists and patricians, there arises with the democratization of culture also the tendency to its becoming localized. Urban art and the enterprising bourgeoisie were the first to produce for themselves a correct local colouring, an art, and a way of thinking in terms of provincial states and districts. Contrary, therefore, to popular belief, the historical trend of culture in Western society was not the growth of a rural and provincial into a national and international culture, but was, rather, a converse development.

¹ In the German history of literature a significant attempt has been made to analyse the rôle of the autochthonous elements in society. Cf. Nadler, J., *Literaturgeschichte der deutschen Stämme und Landschaften*. It would be equally important to reverse the question and attempt an investigation into the significance for culture of the mobile elements.

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After a beginning of splendid cultural integration which at first was international in scope (though it is true that only very narrow circles of élites were affected by it), there gradually grew into this cosmopolitanism a local texture which was first provincial and afterwards national in character. Culture was first brought to Europe, especially to its northern parts, by colonizing monks who humanized the barbarous lands into which they came by imposing upon them a super-local, super-gentile civilization. And for a long time these migrant and locally less settled individuals in our society continued to foster this tradition. It was only very slowly that, side by side with them, the autochthonous elements developed and evolved a culture of their own. From then on two civilizing groups have, in every country, been in conflict with each other. On the one side, the group which, both in the external forms of its life and in its mental outlook, is riveted to the local unit in which it moves ; in the eyes of this group even the inhabitants of the neighbouring village are strangers and foreigners. On the other side, the more mobile group which, being less organically embedded in any concrete single society, is more susceptible to the influences of, and is more in contact with, the stream of events in the whole of European society.

So long as organic evolution continues, these two types of human beings and these two diverging currents of thought mutually enrich each other. Owing to the influence of the mobile type of individual, the other type, whom a certain competency and some property, life in his native country, and the consciousness of a secure future have bound to one locality, is saved from intellectual provincialism, whilst he, in his turn, forces the more abstract and mundane type of person to take account of and spiritually to assimilate the concrete situations and circumstances and the traditions of the surroundings in which he lives. But the very same disturbances and obstacles which are nowadays appearing in the economic system—namely, the rise of autarchic

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tendencies and movements amidst the most highly developed technique of industry and commerce—are beginning to confront us also in the cultural sphere. To economic autarchy there correspond autarchic aspirations in the domain of culture ; for the carriers of local culture endeavour, by excluding from their midst those intellectuals who preserve and develop the international spiritual ties, to renounce all that has penetrated into our culture since the beginnings of humanistic civilization. My colleague, Professor Bonn, spoke of economic de-colonisation.¹ But in the era of autarchic evolution there is proceeding a decolonization even within the boundaries of independent sovereign-states, if by de-colonization is meant that the groups which first settle in these countries drive out those groups whom we called the mobile elements, thus alienating themselves from everything that our culture absorbed from Roman and Christian culture and from international secular development. It is wrong to say that we are thereby thrown back into the Middle Ages. We are cast back beyond the Middle Ages, to the primitive stage of the earliest clan and tribal migrations. Indeed, not a few of the psychic and spiritual phenomena that accompany this de-colonization process can be explained only in terms of the retrogression it implies. Whereas the favourably functioning principle of social selection had hitherto tended to bring those strata which were the bearers of culture to the top, or at least to cause the groups that were thus elevated in the social scale to educate themselves during the process of their rise, and to make those groups which remained on a primitive level of culture feel ashamed of their intellectual backwardness and caused them to hide its symptoms, the negatively functioning principle of selection encourages those who are incapable of controlling their instinct-structure and who, since they have not gone through the long educational process of

¹ Bonn, M., *The Age of Counter-colonization*. Public lecture delivered at the London School of Economics and Political Science, October 19, 1933.

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earlier élites, do not know how to sublimate their instincts, to be arrogant, and to become socially and politically of representative importance. The result of their control of political power is that a regression sets in also in the intellectual life of individuals. It is now the cultured people who suddenly feel ashamed of their education, and who try to suppress that sublimation of their instincts and impulses which they had slowly succeeded in effecting during the lapse of many generations. Thus we see how, as the final result of a negative social-selection, the force of repression, which is latent in every society, can, owing to the expulsion of certain former leading groups, cause the apparatus of suppression to tilt over and function negatively.¹

As regards the formation of élites in a modern mass-society, these, then, are the main sources from which noxious consequences may flow : the multiple variety of élites which renders them unsurveyable ; their repeated failure to acquire exclusiveness ; the modification of competitive effort, and, lastly, the expulsion of the mobile élites—all these factors prepare the ground for the seizure of dictatorial power also in the cultural sphere. I pointed out before that the sociology of culture can be examined, not only from the standpoint of the formation of élites, but that the *relation of these élites to the totality of society* presents new problems which, in their turn, may suggest important clues to the explanation and understanding of the present situation.

The manner in which the élites build themselves into the general texture of a society is not quite a matter of indifference to their future and, hence, to the type of mentality which may be expected to prevail in that society. Different results will issue according as these groups form part of select society, are dependent on individual patronage, on organizations, or on the public at large. In this context, the

¹ The profoundest analysis of the regressions that have set in through social causes is to be found in Freud's "Zeitgenössisches über Krieg und Tod," *Gesammelte Schriften*, vol. IV. (1915).

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first consequence of making it possible for the many to ascend the educational ladder is the *proletarianization of knowledge*¹; there are more educationally qualified people on the market than there are suitable positions for them to fill.² But the vital import of this glut is not that the intellectual professions depreciate in popular estimation, but that culture itself falls to a discount. For it is a sociological law that the social value of a culture is a function of the social worth of those who produce it. To the lay mind it seems that culture is invariably appreciated because of its intrinsic excellence. Research into the history of the social valuation of culture, however, will show, not only that it took a very long time till culture as such secured general recognition, but that, as often as not, the decisive criteria of its worth were the social status and circumstances of those who produced it. Nowadays it is well known how difficult it was for the intellectual nobility to prevail by the side of the warrior stratum from the blood-nobility. There was a time when the worth of a university professor was measured by the number of aristocratic youths who sat at his feet. We know from Greek history that the plastic arts were for a long time looked down upon because the sculptors,

¹ On the proletarianization of knowledge I shall refer only to a few writings :

Historical : Becker, W. M., "Aus dem Gelehrten Proletariat der nachreformatischen Zeit," *Archiv für Kulturgeschichte*, vol. 8, 1911; Michels, "Zur Soziologie der Bohème und ihrer Zusammenhänge mit dem geistigen Proletariat," *Jahrbücher für Nationalökonomie und Statistik*, 3rd series, 81, 6, June 1932.

Recent works : Kassel, R., *Soziale Probleme der Intellektuellen*, Vienna, 1920; Ran-ecker, B., *Die Proletarisierung der geistigen Arbeiter*, Munich, 1920; Eulenburg, Fr., *Die Frequenz der dtsh. Universitäten von ihrer Gründung bis zur Gegenwart*, Leipzig, 1907.

² An example illustrating the recent position of Germany in this respect may be instructive.

The annual excess of supply over demand in the following professions during the past few years was :

	Per cent.
Medical men	100-200
Physicists	100-200
Chemists	100

This does *not* include the reserve army of unemployed members of these professions, which had unsuccessfully been seeking work for several consecutive years. It relates *only* to the yearly additions of newly qualified people in the professions mentioned.

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architects, and painters were originally slaves. Again, it was of vital significance to the sociological importance of culture that the absolutist nobility suddenly needed educated officials, because this occasioned an unexpected rise in the market value of specialists in the humanistic branches of knowledge, e.g., doctors of philosophy. To-day we are witnessing a converse movement. The over-supply of intellectuals lowers the value of intellectualism, of culture. Here, too, there is a latent social mechanism which imperceptibly brings about these changes. That such an over-production in the cultural sphere was not possible in the preceding era of democratic society is explained by the fact that that was the era of democracy for the minorities. Apart from the aristocracy, the only layer from which the intelligentsia were recruited was that of the property owners, so that wealth and culture together formed a closed unit. The intellectual stratum thus came to form part of select society. Sociologically we to-day find ourselves in the stage where the bourgeois democracy of the wealthy strata changes to a democracy of the masses, and where culture ceases to be the monopoly of the few and tends increasingly to become the property of the many. This change at first entailed several very beneficent results. Their too close alliance with "good" society had caused the intelligentsia to fall into the erroneous habit of experiencing culture solely in terms of class-conventions; culture thereby came to acquire an exaggeratedly class-conventional character. No sooner was the intelligentsia detached from the confines of select society and fused with the intellectual elements of the other classes, than a wonderful revitalization of free, cultural life ensued. Culture during this period, as represented, for instance, by the intellectuals of pre-Revolutionary Russia or, indeed, by the late nineteenth-century intelligentsia throughout Europe, was an essentially human thing; free, to a very great extent, from those class-prejudices which previously had always in some measure found their way into it. But

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this increasingly wide selection began to entail harmful effects when not only the quantitative increase in the supply of intellectuals lowered the social valuation of culture but when, in addition, the leading groups began to be recruited *en masse* from among qualitatively progressively inferior social strata. In a society that can give to its various layers only very unequal standards of life, very unequal opportunities for leisure, and vastly dissimilar chances of psychic and spiritual development, the inescapable consequence of handing over the reins of cultural leadership to larger and larger sections of the population is that the average mentality of those groups which, thanks to their drab lot in life, have remained intellectually backward acquires representative significance. Whereas in the society of aristocratic minorities the low average level of education possessed by the oppressed strata remained, as it were, their own secret, the sudden rise of the crowd to predominance in contemporary society gives to that narrowness of mind and outlook which has always characterized the "man in the street" the sanction of official validity, representative status, and public approval. If the influx of the lower strata proceeded slowly, it would be possible for the former leading groups to assimilate the new-comers, as is still very largely the case in England to-day. But when that influx becomes cataclysmic the old intellectual strata lose their assimilative power and are crowded out.

Now, in face of these facts a number of pertinent questions suggest themselves. Why is it that the real mass-popularization of culture could not be diagnosed from the time onwards when the proletariat first came forth with its own cultural purpose and its own cultural ambitions? Why did the signs of cultural primitivism not appear from the very moment when the proletariat began to influence democratic culture? Why is it that the previously mentioned symptoms of cultural disintegration, with all its concomitants, become visible only now, when the demo-

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cratization of culture is affecting strata beyond the proletariat? To solve these questions it is necessary, first of all, to ask: Which are those social layers that have lately been taking both the political and the cultural leadership more and more into their own hands? The answer is: those strata which, in contradistinction to the old bourgeoisie, are commonly referred to as the "new" middle class. It is composed of petty employees, lower officials, impoverished peasants, and declassed *rentiers*.¹

Now, *prima facie*, one might think that this layer could be the carrier of culture just as well as any other, and that a selection of élites which embraced these groups could also be an advantageous selection. In the main, this might be true. But a more exact analysis will show why, during the most recent phase of the expansion of cultural democracy, such a violently sudden change has taken place in the quality of culture. Marx, Max Weber,² and others have demonstrated that the different strata of a society have not the same mentality, and that the fundamental character of the mental outlook of a social group can be explained very largely in terms of its attitude to the economic process of production prevailing in that society. And, indeed, the interest which a group has in the acceleration of further industrialization, technical inventions, and rational organization is, in this

¹ Here, too, some characteristic figures relating to Germany may be instructive.

In 1830, about half of the university students came from families of the so-called "higher officialdom" and the liberal professions, whilst only about a fifth belonged to the stratum commonly designated as "intermediate officials," which was then, and right down to 1890, mainly composed of clergymen and school-teachers. By 1930 the percentage of undergraduates whose parents belonged to the higher officialdom or to the liberal professions had fallen from half to one-fifth; whereas those students whose parents belonged to the intermediate officialdom rose from 20 to over 30 per cent. Here it must be pointed out that the term "intermediate officialdom" now also includes the whole group of petty officials. To show the tremendous increase in the numbers of those members of the lower middle class who entered the universities, the following round numbers may be useful: in 1914 we had 30,000 students belonging to the lower middle class, whilst in 1930 we had 60,000 students of that class.

² The best summary of Max Weber's investigations in this particular field is to be found in the previously mentioned chapter, "Stände Klassen und Religion," in his *Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft*, Grundriss der Sozialökonomik, vol. III.

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connexion, of decisive importance. Certain strata and groups derive their livelihood from the progressive intensification of industrial processes and the creation of larger and larger units of production and management ; hence their economic position makes them favour technical progress and the continued development of those potentialities which the reason and ingenuity of man have devised. It is clear that, since the proletariat owes its means of subsistence to technical inventions, industrial rationalization and large-scale organization, it will tend to carry society farther in the same direction. Thus in Russia, for instance, where it possesses exclusive political power, the proletariat is motivated by this principle to such an extent that, even if for no other reason, it continues to accumulate and industrialize in order to expand as the only social class. Power in this case is used to establish an industrial economic system, and by means of that economic system a social revolution in the proletarian interest is being brought about. But the small economic unit in society, the small shopkeeper and the small-scale producer, adopts a different attitude towards further industrialization ; for technical invention and mass-production are not his friends. To maintain himself he would have to smash the big concerns, the large-scale factories, and the big department-stores. And to effect this, he must put a stop to technical and organizational knowledge. But whoever is capable of thinking just a little sociologically knows that one cannot achieve a retrogression of reason in one particular sphere of human life without at the same time causing a corresponding retrogression in the whole of man's spiritual and psychic constitution. He who wants to revert to the social and economic organization of the pre-capitalistic era must also remould the whole basis of our civilization on the lines of the civilization of pre-capitalistic human beings. He must, that is to say, in order to save himself, be prepared artificially to arrest and repel the entire forces of social development which, driven by the powers of human reason

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and ingenuity, tend increasingly in the direction of intensified industrialization, technical rationalization, and large-scale organization. Just as the industrial proletariat is forced to try to achieve an economic revolution by political means, and a social revolution and general proletarianization by economic means, so the new middle class is likewise driven, for self-preservation, to resort to force and other instruments of political power in order to invert the process of industrial development, to stop the continuance of rational social progress, and to cause a regression in the evolution of the modern humane and reasoning type of human being. That such a radical transformation of society to suit the aspirations of one or other of the social groups or strata cannot eventuate spontaneously, but must be brought about by force, stands to reason. The type of human being who would satisfy those who aspire to a society in which there is no other class but the proletariat, which is through and through industrial in character, and which is suffused with reason and enlightenment, will not evolve from surroundings in which everything is allowed to take its course and grow spontaneously without external interference, any more than the pre-capitalistic type of individual will, at the present stage of social progress, come into being again through his own initiative, and is, therefore, being bred by systematic force and social and cultural planning. Thus, in this connexion, too, we see that the unorganized growth of democratic society leads to dictatorship. But therewith also all those dangers that accompany the over-institutionalization of the use of force set in in the sphere of culture.

We can reproach the democratic constitution of society with numerous shortcomings—nor, certainly, have I been sparing in my criticisms of it—but we must concede that it has one merit, namely, that whenever something ensues that leads to false developments, it always leaves the way open for counter-currents and self-correctives. The great advantage of the liberal form of organization, even in a

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mass-society, is that it possesses a tremendous elasticity, so that if now and again something unpleasant and vexatious occurs, a counter-movement, coming from some unexpected quarter, spontaneously develops to bring about a reaction. But quite apart from considerations like these, it would be quite erroneous to try to read into this discussion a contempt and disdain for the masses as such. I am firmly convinced that modern society will sooner or later be able, from its social forms, to evolve for itself a pattern of culture, just as this was, more or less, the case in all the other historical phases of social life. The real malady of modern society is due, not to the vast numbers who compose it, but to the fact that the mechanism of liberal institutions has hitherto failed to evolve those articulations which are necessary to the Great Society, and has failed to provide it with the opportunities for considered self-expression, so that, as we have seen, recurrent false developments must inevitably take place. The evil, in other words, lies not in large numbers, but, rather, in the lack of articulation. Modern psychology and sociology have shown that the same crowd of people will react differently according as it is organized and articulated in organic groups or appears simply as an inarticulate mass.¹ The weaknesses and shortcomings with which the masses are popularly credited are actually attributable only to the inarticulate masses, and the false developments of the liberal mechanism in modern society may, perhaps, be

¹ On the literature dealing with the masses, which began with the well-known writings of Sighele and Le Bon, and which since then has been raised to a very much wider plane of discussion in the various countries, I shall here cite only a few general works, in which the reader will find further bibliographical references. In German cf. Vleugels, *Die Masse* (Ergänzungsheft, 3d Kölner Vierteljahrshefte für Soziologie), 1930; Colm's article on "Masse" in the *Handwörterbuch der Soziologie* (ed. Vierkandt); v. Wiese, *System d. Allg. Soziologie*, 2nd ed., 1933, the chapter on "Masse."

In the English literature on the subject cf. particularly: Wallas, G., *The Great Society*, 1914; Tayler, *Social Life and the Crowd*, Boston, 1923; Thomas, *Industry, Emotion, and Unrest*, N.Y., 1920; Christensen: *Politics and Crowd-Morality*, N.Y., 1915. In the psycho-analytical treatment of the problem the standard work is still Freud, S., *Mass Psychology and Ego-Analysis*, N.Y., 1923. Cf. also the bibliographies appended to the articles on "Crowd" and "Masses" in vols. 4 and 10 of the *Encyclopædia of the Social Sciences*.

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phenomena of the phase in which the apparatus of selection and the other social apparatuses, which were originally devised to fit a narrower framework, break down in face of the sudden and violent impact of the influx of the masses. This situation is comparable to that of a select provincial theatre in which the seating accommodation to meet the requirements of a small group of people of rank is acoustically and in every other way perfect, but is numerically strictly limited ; suddenly this theatre is called on to accommodate a huge crowd, so that no one can find a place in the auditorium, and a frightful scrimmage results. Obviously, the existing structure of the theatre cannot meet the new situation.

Maybe, that the afore-mentioned false developments arising from the defective functioning of the liberal mechanism are merely the expression of this transitory phase ; this, however, does not by any means imply that a society or a culture may not also be destroyed during that period. But in this connexion one fact in particular must be stressed : dictatorship, as opposed to the excrescences and negative developments of liberalism, is in no sense a polar organization ; that is to say, it is not the antithesis of the liberal and democratic structure of society, and is, therefore, in and by itself, no remedy for all that went wrong in that society. It would be much more correct to conceive of dictatorships as being themselves engendered by the negatively operating forces in a mass-democracy. A dictatorship is, in essence, the attempt on the part of a certain group to stabilize by force a—to itself favourable—fortuitous and one-sided epoch in the development of liberal society, together with all the imperfections characteristic of that epoch.

In this paper I cannot venture on a detailed analysis of the whole mechanism of dictatorial society in its effects on culture. Such an analysis, however, is largely obviated by the fact that the destructive effects of dictatorship on culture are even more glaringly apparent than are those of a planless

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interference in the economic sphere. But reference must be made to one fact which most people are wont to overlook : dictatorship is not necessarily synonymous with planning. To cure an ailing society by setting up a dictatorship is like curing a sick child by forbidding it to cry, forbidding it, that is to say, to give outward expression to its pain.

Let me give just one proof that dictatorship does not imply planning. A real and effective planning of culture, which, in the sense of the Totalitarian State, would plan everything, would also have to plan the place of criticism. It would have to provide places where fruitful self-criticisms and the experiences of those who are affected by planning can gather and find open expression. It is, of course, possible that arbitrary criticism and irresponsible public propaganda may have disintegrative effects. On the other hand, there is also the grave contingency that in a large society the experiences that accumulate at different points in the course of its evolution may in the long run be passed over unheeded. But in a society under a dictatorship the creation of such a kind of self-registry, as we might call it, is quite out of the question ; rather would it appear that the object of any planning there might be in a dictatorially governed society is to make any kind of criticism impossible.

Now after all this, you will ask whether this discussion implies that in the present era of mass-societies everything is hopeless, and that we must now face an irretrievable decline of culture? No ; this is not at all my view. What I do believe is that we have reached a point where the leaving of things to themselves must entail certain consequences of a negative character. It is my view, therefore, that we shall not be able to escape planning even in the cultural sphere, and that the educational system that suited the individualized type of person in a society of a few leading élites cannot also be successfully applied to the education and mental training of the masses. Again, it is my view that we must not wait

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until the false developments themselves produce those groups to whom planning means a despotism in their own interests. To me planning signifies, not the oppression of the entire living structure of society and the attempt to replace creative life by an uncritical conformity to dictatorial orders, which is the final aim and purpose of the Totalitarian State, but a planned intervention at those points of the social apparatus where the sources of its defective functioning are found to lie, and where, from our general understanding of the social mechanism, we know that we are not only remedying symptoms, but are conscious of the long-run consequences of the corrective measures we apply.

In this connexion it must not be forgotten that in the cultural sphere (probably also in the economic) there was never an absolute liberalism in the sense that the free sway of social forces was not accompanied by any form of planning, by a planned system of public instruction, for instance, with its hierarchy of elementary schools, secondary schools, and universities. We know that the Liberal State, too, controlled whole districts, and prescribed, not only the kind of knowledge that was to be instilled into the different strata of their population, but that the various social élites were even accustomed to, and disciplined in, those patterns of behaviour which fitted their respective stations in life. There is, therefore, nothing novel and nothing which conflicts with the reality of a liberal society, in my assertion that the most suitable state of affairs would be a well-articulated co-existence of the free, spontaneously creative texture of society on the one hand, and a planned, institutional sphere of social life on the other. But we must set about our planning activities with a greater insight into the nature of the forces that tend to create or destroy culture ; we must constantly keep in mind that the problems we are called upon to solve are the result of an excessively quick transformation of a democracy of minority groups in society into a democracy of the broad masses ; and we must devise ways and means

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whereby this expansion of democracy will lead, not to a general lowering, but to a general raising, of our cultural standards.

It is, as you will understand, impossible to solve these problems and to indicate the ways of planning, in a single lecture. My aim in this paper has been to show that both planning and the absence of planning in a society have effects on culture, and that it is not a mere accident if sociologists to-day discover certain connexions between culture and society, for the influence of the social process on the cultural as on other spheres of life, is becoming more and more clearly evident. And I have endeavoured to illustrate, by a few examples, how the sociology of culture is able so far to trace connexions that were hitherto deemed to be impenetrable, until eventually they can provide verifiable answers to the questions which it is our task, as sociologists, to solve ; thereby, also, I hope to have demonstrated that sociology is essentially concerned with problems which, in the days that lie immediately ahead, may prove to be of vital import for the future of our society, our intelligentsia, and our culture.

AN ESTIMATE OF THE FUTURE POPULATION OF GREAT BRITAIN

By GRACE G. LEYBOURNE

ESTIMATES of the future population of Great Britain have been published by Bowley,¹ and by the Committee on Empire Migration.² Since the situation undergoes such rapid changes, it seems worth while to make another estimate based on the most recent data. For the benefit of those interested in the methods used, the exact procedure followed in making the estimate is explained in an appendix to this article. An estimate is not a prophecy. No one can prophesy the future population of any country tomorrow. But it is possible to calculate the future population of any country if it is assumed that the forces governing population act with a certain intensity in the future. This is what has been done in making the accompanying estimate.

It should first be made clear that no account is taken of the effect of such migration movements as may occur. In other words, it is assumed that no migration movements take place. This is unlikely. The reason for omitting them is that it is very difficult to know what movements there will be. Figures of net migration movements exist from 1872 to 1923 for the British Isles. From 1924 to the present day we have figures for Great Britain and Northern Ireland. In pre-war times, as far back as the figures go, there was always a net loss by migration movements from the British Isles; the highest loss was 315,409 in 1881 and the lowest 37,721 in 1894. In post-war times until 1931 there was also a net annual loss; the average annual loss between 1924 and 1929 from Great Britain and Northern Ireland was 92,341. In 1930 the loss was only 25,455. In 1931 there was a net gain of 37,072 and in 1932 a gain of 48,607. The conversion of loss into gain is

¹ *Economic Journal*, vol. XXXIV, 1924, p. 188.

² *Report of the Committee on Empire Migration*, Appendix 2.

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clearly due to the depression. If prosperity returns we may once more expect to lose by migration, but how much we shall lose no one can say. The relevant point is that since we can hope that a measure of prosperity will return, the estimated population will be less by whatever loss there may be.

The estimate is based upon certain assumptions as to the future course of the mortality and fertility rates. It is assumed that the mortality rates will remain much as at present. Though we may legitimately expect some improvement in mortality rates, the amount of likely (and even of possible) improvement is as a rule exaggerated in popular estimation. We have made such progress in reducing the chances of death that further progress will be most marked where there is most room for improvement, namely, in the older age groups ; but while progress of this nature will mean that rather more people will be living at any one time than are shown in this estimate, it will not much affect the trend of the population because trend is mainly governed by the proportion of women of child-bearing age in the population and by their fertility.

The birth-rate has, of course, been declining for years. The birth-rate (the number of births per 1,000 of all ages) is the resultant of several factors, the proportion of women of child-bearing age in the population, their age distribution within the child-bearing period, the amount of marriage and the fertility of married and unmarried women. When making the estimate we take into account changes in the proportion of women of child-bearing age in the population, and we assume that the amount of marriage will continue on present lines. We also assume that the fertility of child-bearing women as a whole will decline until 1944 and will then stabilize. The reasons for this latter assumption are twofold. As years go by, the average age of the child-bearing women will increase and, since the greater the age the less the chance of bearing a child, there will be fewer children to a

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given number of women. Secondly, it cannot be supposed that the practice of family limitation has yet really reached its limit. This assumption is likely to err in the direction of over-estimating the future population because, to mention only one consideration, the average age of child-bearing women will continue to increase after 1944. Therefore any underestimate due to failure to take improvement in the mortality rates into account will be counterbalanced by the overestimate due to the method of forecasting fertility.

Looking at the figures arrived at in this manner, we see that the population of Great Britain will increase slowly for a few more years and will then decline. In 1941 the total population will be about the same as in 1931. The decline will be slow at first; in 1951 the total will be about two millions less than now. Thereafter the decline becomes more rapid, so that twenty years later on the same assumptions it will have fallen by another ten millions. It would be dangerous, however, to lay much stress on an estimate so far ahead, because we cannot be sure that the variable factors in the problems will continue to show their present tendencies. It is of interest to observe that the decline in the population of Scotland will not begin until later than in England and Wales, and that even by 1966 the decline will not be large. The reason is, of course, that the decline in the birth-rate has not gone so far in Scotland as in England and Wales.

There will at the same time be important changes in the age and sex constitution of the population. In the table the population is divided into children (0-15), young workers (15-45), older workers (45-65), and pensioners (over 65). The nature of the changes in age constitution is shown when the percentages which these groups form of the whole population at different dates are calculated.

	1931.	1951.	1976.
0-15. . .	24.2	15.5	12.5
15-45. . .	40.9	47.4	36.6
45-65. . .	21.7	25.9	33.4
Over 65 . . .	7.2	11.2	17.5

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In 1951 the total working population will be relatively larger than at present, and the increase will be mainly in the younger section of the working force. The dependents will include relatively more elderly persons and relatively fewer children. In 1976 the working force will form a slightly smaller proportion of the whole population than in 1951, but it will consist to a far larger extent of the older section of the workers, and among dependents elderly persons will then outnumber the children. In regard to the sex ratio there will be a tendency, as the years pass, towards an equalization of the proportion of the sexes in the population as a whole, though in 1976 there will still be about a million more women than men. This equalization will be actually realized in the age-group 15-45, which is the group that from one point of view matters most ; even in 1941 the surplus of women in this group will be negligible. (See tables on pages 134-6.)

METHOD ADOPTED IN MAKING THE ESTIMATE

In making the estimate, the figures for Scotland were dealt with independently of the figures for England and Wales. Also, the figures for males in each area were separated from the figures for females. Since, however, the method followed in making the estimate was the same for each group, it will suffice if the details are given for males in England and Wales alone.

The starting-point is the population at the middle of the year 1931, as estimated by the Registrar-General, which is given for each sex in quinquennial age-groups as follows :

0-, 5-, 10-, 75-, 80-, 85-,

the last group being indefinite.

For reasons already given, the effect of migration on the figures is ignored throughout. Birth and Death are the only two factors taken into account. In five years' time, i.e. by the middle of 1936, the survivors of the males in the above age-groups will have grown 5 years older, and a new group will have been born to take the place of those in the first group of age less than 5 years. It is clear that the birth-rate does not enter into the estimate for the age-groups from 5 years upwards, since no males who will be 5 years old or more by the middle of 1936 can have been born after the middle of 1931. In other words, the decline of the

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ESTIMATED FUTURE POPULATION OF GREAT BRITAIN IN HUNDREDS

AGES	MALES						
	1931	1936	1941	1946	1951	1956	1976
0-15 .	5,474.3	5,079.8	4,432.9	3,842.8	3,344.0	2,988.6	2,072.5
15-45 .	10,073.4	10,367.2	10,663.8	10,590.0	10,130.1	9,378.2	6,020.6
45-65 .	4,543.4	4,615.8	4,617.2	4,694.5	5,016.0	5,436.7	5,407.0
65 + .	1,395.7	1,577.4	1,773.7	1,897.4	1,959.1	1,960.0	2,333.7
Total. .	21,486.8	21,640.2	21,487.6	21,024.7	20,449.2	19,763.5	15,833.8

	FEMALES						
	1931	1936	1941	1946	1951	1956	1976
0-15 .	5,366.3	4,987.3	4,358.4	3,767.9	3,277.2	2,929.3	2,033.6
15-45 .	10,979.2	10,989.3	10,969.2	10,631.4	10,089.3	9,315.6	5,941.6
45-65 .	5,186.6	5,464.9	5,671.7	5,855.9	6,045.3	6,251.3	5,507.7
65 + .	1,814.6	2,062.4	2,352.9	2,610.2	2,810.9	2,933.9	3,395.2
Total. .	23,346.7	23,503.9	23,352.2	22,865.4	22,222.7	21,430.1	16,878.1

	PERSONS						
	1931	1936	1941	1946	1951	1956	1976
0-15 .	10,840.6	10,067.1	8,791.3	7,610.7	6,621.2	5,917.9	4,106.1
15-45 .	21,052.6	21,356.5	21,633.0	21,221.4	20,219.4	18,693.8	11,962.2
45-65 .	9,730.0	10,080.7	10,288.9	10,550.4	11,061.3	11,688.0	10,914.7
65 + .	3,210.3	3,639.8	4,126.6	4,507.6	4,770.0	4,893.9	5,728.9
Total. .	44,833.5	45,144.1	44,839.8	43,890.1	42,671.9	41,193.6	32,711.9

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ESTIMATED FUTURE POPULATION OF ENGLAND AND WALES IN HUNDREDS

AGES	MALES							
	1931	1936	1941	1946	1951	1956	1966	1976
0-15 .	4,817.7	4,449.6	3,855.8	3,306.6	2,846.4	2,520.3	2,120.2	1,697.0
15-45 .	9,019.4	9,255.5	9,490.0	9,400.1	8,948.8	8,236.3	6,642.8	5,131.3
45-65 .	4,079.5	4,149.5	4,152.2	4,216.8	4,504.5	4,879.0	5,163.4	4,775.8
65 + .	1,243.4	1,413.0	1,593.7	1,708.0	1,769.4	1,771.3	1,846.8	2,110.2
Total. .	19,160.0	19,267.6	19,091.7	18,631.5	18,069.1	17,406.9	15,773.2	13,714.3

AGES	FEMALES							
	1931	1936	1941	1946	1951	1956	1966	1976
0-15 .	4,719.8	4,366.2	3,789.9	3,241.5	2,789.2	2,469.6	2,080.7	1,665.2
15-45 .	9,822.5	9,801.4	9,749.3	9,419.4	8,901.3	8,178.9	6,591.8	5,088.7
45-65 .	4,672.8	4,929.4	5,116.3	5,277.5	5,437.6	5,609.2	5,507.4	5,038.9
65 + .	1,612.9	1,848.9	2,122.8	2,363.7	2,551.5	2,666.0	2,924.7	3,149.5
Total. .	20,828.0	20,945.9	20,778.3	20,302.1	19,679.6	18,923.7	17,104.6	14,942.3

AGES	PERSONS							
	1931	1936	1941	1946	1951	1956	1966	1976
0-15 .	9,537.5	8,815.8	7,645.7	6,548.1	5,635.6	4,989.9	4,200.9	3,362.2
15-45 .	18,841.9	19,056.9	19,239.3	18,819.5	17,850.1	16,415.2	13,234.6	10,220.0
45-65 .	8,752.3	9,078.9	9,268.5	9,494.3	9,942.1	10,488.2	10,670.8	9,814.7
65 + .	2,856.3	3,261.9	3,716.5	4,071.7	4,320.9	4,437.3	4,771.5	5,259.7
Total. .	39,988.0	40,213.5	39,870.0	38,933.6	37,748.7	36,330.6	32,877.8	28,656.6

ESTIMATED FUTURE POPULATION OF SCOTLAND IN HUNDREDS

AGES	MALES						
	1931	1936	1941	1946	1951	1956	1966
0-15 .	656,6	630,2	577,1	536,2	497,6	468,3	427,5
15-45 .	1,054,0	1,111,7	1,173,8	1,189,9	1,181,3	1,141,9	1,017,7
45-65 .	463,9	466,3	465,0	477,7	511,5	557,7	625,7
65 + .	152,3	164,4	180,0	189,4	189,7	188,7	197,1
Total .	2,326,8	2,372,6	2,395,9	2,393,2	2,380,1	2,356,6	2,268,0
FEMALES							
0-15 .	646,5	621,1	568,5	526,4	488,0	459,7	419,8
15-45 .	1,156,7	1,187,9	1,219,9	1,212,0	1,188,0	1,136,7	1,009,1
45-65 .	513,8	535,5	555,4	578,4	607,7	642,1	656,5
65 + .	201,7	213,5	230,1	246,5	259,4	267,9	290,5
Total .	2,518,7	2,558,0	2,573,9	2,563,3	2,543,1	2,506,4	2,375,9
PERSONS							
0-15 .	1,303,1	1,251,3	1,145,6	1,062,6	985,6	928,0	847,3
15-45 .	2,210,7	2,299,6	2,393,7	2,401,9	2,369,3	2,278,6	2,026,8
45-65 .	977,7	1,001,8	1,020,4	1,056,1	1,119,2	1,199,8	1,282,2
65 + .	354,0	377,9	410,1	435,9	449,1	456,6	487,6
Total .	4,845,5	4,930,6	4,969,8	4,956,5	4,923,2	4,863,0	4,643,9
							4,055,3

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birth-rate has no influence on any of the figures except those in the first age-group when an estimate is to be made of the population in mid-1936. The other age-groups will, therefore, be considered first.

The males of age 5-9 (last birthday) in 1936 are the survivors of the males who were of age 0-4 in 1931. The number of these survivors is determined by applying to the original figures an appropriate death-rate, namely, the mean of the known death-rates for the age-groups 0-4 and 5-9. For this mean, instead of taking a single year's experience, an average was taken in general over the years 1924-1932, going back 10 years from the date of the calculation. At the higher age-groups, from 60 upwards, where this method would not have been sufficiently accurate, a curve was fitted to the averages of the known death-rates for quinquennial age-groups in the years 1924-1932 by the method of least squares, and from this curve the death-rates in particular years could be determined. Further, to get a death-rate suitable to a moving 5-year group (such as 60-64 moving to 65-69 by 1936), the mean death-rates were weighted in the proportion 3 to 1, because at these higher ages deaths increase with such rapidity as to make an unweighted mean unsatisfactory. The ratio 3 to 1 is arbitrary but not inappropriate: it is suggested by an examination of the trend of the figures. The mean age of the group, age 80 and upwards, was assumed to be 85, and death-rates at this stage were applied to each individual year.

We turn now to consider the group of age 0-4 in mid-1936, which is determined by births as well as deaths taking place during the five-year interval between mid-1931 and mid-1936. The number of women of age 15-45 in mid-1931 is known and, in the manner already explained, the number of women of age 15-45 in mid-1936 has been estimated. The mean of these two figures gives us an estimate of the number at the end of 1933. Again, the number of married women as a proportion of all women between the ages of 15 and 45 is known for recent census years, 1901-1931. It was not suitable to go back beyond 1901, because the trend in the proportion has been consistently upwards since that date—previously it was consistently downwards. A straight line was fitted to the proportions from 1924 to 1931 in order to get estimates of the proportion married in subsequent years. It would have been unreasonable, however, to assume that the proportion would go on increasing indefinitely; the assumption made is that the rate becomes stabilized in 10 years' time from the date of calculation, i.e. in 1944. The same principle has been adopted in estimating the future birth-rate, dealing separately with legitimate and illegitimate births. The legitimate birth-rate for married women between the ages of 15 and 45 is known for recent

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years. Starting back 10 years from the date of calculation, a straight line was fitted to this birth-rate for the years 1924-1931, and it was assumed that the rate would become stabilized 10 years ahead, in 1944. By applying then the legitimate birth-rate for 1933 to the number of married women living in that year, and the illegitimate birth-rate to the number of unmarried women living at the same date, an estimate was obtained of the number of births per annum during 5 years 1931-1936. The survivors of these infants form the age-group 0-4 last birthday in 1936.

In applying the appropriate death-rates—which are known for the first year as well as for the first quinquennium of life, again taking the experience of the years 1924-1931 as the basis of the estimate—the figures for each of the five years were calculated separately, attention being paid to the fact that infants born between mid-1931 and mid-1932 would leave fewer survivors by mid-1936 than infants born in one of the subsequent years and so on ; also, for infants born between mid-1935 and mid-1936 the death-rate was clearly applicable only over a 6-months period, i.e. the first 6 months of life.

When the population had been determined in the manner described above for each sex and each age-group in mid-1936, it was possible to repeat the process (with the original assumptions as to stabilization) in order to estimate the population in mid-1941, and so on at successive intervals of 5 years.

In making a corresponding forecast of the population of Scotland, a mid-year estimate of the population in 1931 was not available. The 1931 census figures were used instead and allowance was made for the lag of about two months between the date of the census and the middle of the year in combining the figures for Scotland with those for England and Wales.

FACT AND VALUE IN SOCIOLOGY

By R. R. MARETT

IN addressing this Society a second time from the Chair, I make no apology for again calling attention to first principles. We sociologists are notoriously vague, not to say confused, in respect to our architectonic. For this indefiniteness of outlook, however, we can offer plausible excuse in the sheer size and complexity of our subject-matter. This being nothing less than the social factor in human life, we find ourselves committed to the comprehensive study of all that is covered by the term "culture"—or "civilization," as we call it in so far as it agrees sufficiently with our own habits. But therein lies the very essence of human history. Other living things have no history, or at any rate none that they can remember and record; whereas Man is differentiated from them by nothing else so much as by his power of accumulating a social tradition, and using it to enlarge and reinforce individual experience as a means of survival. Now the difficulties of thinking at once analytically and on a very concrete basis being what they are, it is likely that amplitude of scope and inconclusiveness of method must ever go together. Even so, we claim to be an organization, not a mob. To a like extent, therefore, we are pledged to pursue some common policy; which can be done only if we constantly re-examine the further implications of the task that lies before us.

The point, then, that I propose for consideration is the following: Does Sociology set out to treat human values as if they were simply facts; and, if so, how far is such a treatment feasible and useful?

At the risk of divagating into metaphysics, let us begin by seeking a meaning for "fact" as the empirical or positive sciences understand the term. Needless to say, the historical associations of Sociology are with the sciences in question.

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Nay, its very name—that “convenient barbarism” as Mill called it—proves as much; for it could never have been invented by a friend of the classics and therefore an ally of the humanities. Anyone who has been brought up on the humanities—the typical Oxford man, for instance—will, long before he ever heard of Sociology, have become familiar with a social science modelled on the politics of Plato and Aristotle. Now there we have, as all must admit, an intellectual discipline of superb range; more especially since, for the Greek, politics not only carried on a joint business with ethics, but even ranked as the senior partner of the firm. These sciences of the ancients, however, were essentially normative rather than inductive in method. They might by way of inchoate induction review current opinions in some detail before proceeding to prescribe ideal principles conformable with human aspiration; but ultimately the whole constructive argument hung on certain values laid down legislator-fashion. Such values might, or might not, be stated in an absolute form, but the absoluteness in question could only be analogous to that of one professing to rule by divine right, a pope claiming infallibility. They were necessary only so far as an act of pure will could make them so.

In sharp contrast we have the sciences of the inductive type which base their logical constructions not on values but on facts. It is in such a company that Sociology would have itself enrolled. And yet it must be confessed that its position in the hierarchy is never likely to be high. It is not of such stuff that Presidents of the Royal Society are made. Only in the normative sphere does social science come to its own as the royal science *par excellence*, the supreme concern of the philosopher-king. The trouble is, from the inductive point of view, that social facts regarded as building material do not give good enough results; they seem to produce nothing stable. For the sciences of this order pride themselves on the solidity of their foundations. They proclaim themselves

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positive, being apparently unaware that the word "positive" is ambiguous, and might just as legitimately be used to connote normativeness. Thus the judicious Hooker writes: "In laws, that which is natural bindeth universally; that which is positive, not so." But the inductive sciences insist in the same breath that they are both natural and positive. Perhaps it is as well that they should be allowed to take over an expression that will serve to remind them that in selecting fact as their foundation they are positing something too. They put their trust in the uniformities of sensible observation, just as the normative sciences do in the uniformities of moral conviction. Now it would take a lot to persuade an anthropologist accustomed to survey at large the manifold vagaries of insensate humanity that strict uniformity, affording an evidential ground for a presumption of necessary law, is to be reached in either of these directions; nor, as any psychologist must allow, is individual experience less prone to vacillation, verging on self-contradiction, in its various impressions and affirmations. Nevertheless, it may well be true as a working rule of life that, relatively speaking, judgments of fact are to be reckoned more substantial as a ground-work of intellectual castle-building than judgments of value, if only because they are more widely shared, and hence offer better support for the average gregarious man. Tried by that most ultimate of practical standards, mass-opinion, the democratic vote, the argument from consent, sense is more steadfast than sensibility. Thus it makes an excellent compass for setting a course. It is well to remember, however, that this in itself can never amount to planning the voyage; for in the latter case the owner's wishes are paramount, and the mechanics of the enterprise become secondary to its guiding purpose.

Fact, then, is fate, the last word of the sense-world, the ineluctable aspect of experience, which is hypostatized by the uncritical mind, so that it seems to possess, if not a will of its own, at any rate a self-dependent power of cold obstruction

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limiting our will from without. It is thus the converse—one might almost say the adverse—of spontaneity, either as we know it in ourselves or as we extend it by analogy to living things in general. Literally and etymologically fact stands for the inevitability of the already accomplished, the irreversibility of a has-been, the finality of a “that is that.” The Latin *factum* is not to be translated “made” in this connexion; for it is precisely our ultimate participation in the matter that is conveniently ignored. It means, on the contrary, “done” and, so to speak, “done with”; because the only way to get level with the past and have a chance of undoing it would be to abolish time altogether. If, on the other hand, the notion of fact is projected into the future, or even if it is treated as a condition of the fleeting yet ever-immediate present, time no longer conspires with the past to make it seemingly all-compelling as a *vis a tergo*. Actual or eventual fact is always contingent, and always qualified by present or impending novelty. However thoroughly we may try to resolve the already given into a complex of would-be timeless causes operating with a like unalterable givenness, our experience on that side of it which is intuitively aware of a forward thrust, an *élan vital*, reveals a generative vigour which is *pro tanto* fact-transforming and fate-defying. Moreover, the event is wont to confirm this intimation of the human spirit by its truly dramatic unexpectedness; for to say that “the more it changes, the more it is the same thing” is but one of those paradoxes that make play with the lesser half-truth. That we find ourselves alive and active in a world that has to put up with it is retrospectively a fact. But immediately and therefore in a deeper sense it is likewise a challenge to fact, a declaration of independence validating our right to struggle for an existence of our own conditioning and choosing.

It only remains to add that the sciences which deal with fact are not necessarily in the pay of the enemy, as too warm adherents of the humanistic faith might sometimes seem to

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imagine. They are rather spies sent out to discover his real strength and weakness. They advise us, for instance, not to attack him in his outlying dominions such as the ultragalactic systems, but to look for chances nearer home, namely, in the more hospitable parts of this planet—a poor thing, perhaps, but already on the way to become our own. For we need sound information, and cool calculation based thereon, as well as sheer buoyancy of enthusiasm, if we are to get the better of fact in the sense of the sum total of the difficulties of the vital situation, not excluding our own former shortcomings and mistakes. It is, however, on the latter subject that our intelligence-service tends to be especially weak. The reason is plain enough, namely, that to think of ourselves in terms of fact is, in view of our mixed record, apt to prove decidedly damaging to our self-conceit. Hence, whereas we rejoice in objectivity or matter-of-factness, so long as material conditions are alone in question, the most accurate observations concerning our rather rickety morale, however needful it may be to take account of its fluctuations in a war so prolonged and with a battle-front so far-flung, meet with a doubtful reception at headquarters, and as likely as not are quickly shelved. To drop the fighting metaphor—though truly the struggle for existence is no unfair description of the actualities of the life-process—a scientific in the sense of an objective history of mankind is not readily forthcoming, and chiefly, one may suspect, because nobody wants to have his past brought up against him. Even if science claims as its own that so-called child of Nature, the savage, as standing at one clear remove from the practical interests of the dominant peoples, it cannot wholly prevent him from being converted by tiresome if well-meaning persons into matter for edification, whether as a shining example or as an awful warning. So, whereas the historian-artist, if he has the flattering touch, can get good money out of the snobs and launch out as a gentleman, the sociologist, as a historian-photographer whose talents lean towards the

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mechanical, finds but little lucrative employment, and must be content to set up in a back-street in the trading part of the town. Yet, putting aside the question of remuneration as affording no sure index of merit, we have to enquire how far two distinct and in some sense rival modes of depicting the true Man, outside and inside, countenance and character in one, can exist side by side or even be combined ; so that the worker in values and the worker in facts, the artist and the artificer, can both in their several ways help us to envisage ourselves as nearly to the life as may be possible in the circumstances.

To turn now to the subject of value, this clearly relates to life potential rather than to life as simply lived up to the present. A value can be described as an imagined satisfaction, if we look at it from the side of feeling ; while, regarded from the side of the will, it is an imagined option. No human being can live for the moment so utterly as not to be partly possessed by hopes and fears relating to a beyond ; and this he cannot refrain from translating into terms of possible experience, even when imminent death stares him in the face. On the other hand, no calculation based on previous experience can enable him to take the complete measure of what lies ahead ; nor at a pinch does the wise man put his trust in any mere knowledge so much as in a native resolution which seems to represent the life-force itself, since it bids him "never say die." This power may in certain conditions compel him, against all likelihood of safety or success, to play the part of an *Athanasius contra mundum* ; that is, for the sake of some hitherto unrealized principle, to fly in the face of all known facts, as even the most learned men are privileged to know them. Thereupon, it may be, the single seed proves a mutation destined to cover whole continents with unexpected harvests as by a miracle of special creation. Not that the pioneer-temper is universal or even common among mankind. Unfortunately, as the Preacher reminds us, the battle is not to the strong, or at least not always ; whereas, whichever

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way it goes, certain human jackals take their pickings, and after their sneaking fashion also manage to inherit the earth. Nevertheless, the leadership of the world is vested in its heroes, who are likewise visionaries to a man. These know, or perhaps rather feel, that the core of reality is constituted not by fact but by inspiration.

It is not, however, with the man of action and his deeds that we are concerned here, but rather with the kind of thought that can make his purposes explicit, whether to him or to the world that has need of him. A value always embodies a meaning such as can be expressed in rational terms ; though it must not be forgotten that rationality comprises more than mere understanding, and makes its appeal to head and heart alike and together. When we speak of the normative disciplines as sciences—arts being at least as appropriate a description of them—we may easily be led to over-emphasize their purely intellectual side. No doubt their typical form is that of a ratiocinative system which is exhibited in its dependence on some end ; and often this end is taken to be so obviously desirable that very little is said to advertise its attractions, as it were on the principle that good wine needs no bush. Hence a pettifogging mind is apt to ignore the *proæmium legis* which defines the statutory intention as a whole, and to pass on to wrestle with the thousand and one consequential regulations that swell the body of the act. Experience assures us, however, that the minor tactics of life hardly affect the main issue if only the strategy is sound. Though it may require the meticulous expertness of an Aristotle to codify the maxims of a reasonable ethics, it takes a Plato, burning with the fire of prophecy, to announce the Idea of the Good as the crowning justification of all human striving. Let the myriad applications of it fail, yet the golden rule stands inviolate, being ever beyond our grasp and yet within our reach. To cite the Preacher once more : “ Lo, this only have I found, that God hath made man upright ; but they have sought out many inventions.”

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The real strength, then, of the normative treatment of value in any form, supreme or departmental, lies, or ought to lie, in its initial affirmation ; for it is constitutive and so to speak creative of all that follows. This, however, is work for a philosopher-poet rather than for a man of science, for the pulpit rather than for the laboratory. It calls for the fervour that can propagate as well as promulgate a creed, and not simply for the canniness that estimates the profits and risks thereby entailed. It must declare the authority of the director, over and above the mere calculations of the accountant. To draw up a prospectus as compared with a mere balance-sheet must ever rank as the more responsible task, because, while brains count for at least as much, character becomes of far greater importance. Nevertheless, while we thus assign to the normative exercise of the mind the higher part, because in championing value it brings Man's stock of faculties more fully into play, we must none the less allow that it is extremely difficult in practice to attain to the level of reason, or whatever we are to call the outcome of a good working-alliance between intellect and emotion. To blow hot and cold together is proverbially unmanageable, and yet a cool disinterestedness has somehow to be combined with an interest as warm as the very blood in our veins. Yet the thing can be done ; for Plato at least does it, standing therefore in my eyes, if I may make a personal confession, as the completest and most divine of philosophers—I had almost said " and of anthropologists as well." There are some of my colleagues, however, in the last-named department of science who hold that their first business is to dehumanize Man as far as it may be feasible. One must play onlooker, they say, to the game of life and pretend that one is no player oneself, or at any rate a retired one, and with not one farthing staked on the result. Such a spectator, like some visitor from the Celestial Empire witnessing the strange antics of sundry foreign devils, might occasionally spy out details apt to be overlooked or misinterpreted by the more enthusiastic

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type of partisan. On the other hand, to appreciate a sporting event for what it is truly worth to those more immediately concerned might, nay, almost certainly would, be clean beyond his range. Thus there are difficulties either way in taking stock of the human life-struggle, whether one is too sympathetic to be judge of its incidents fairly, or not sympathetic enough to be in touch with its spirit. A normative interpretation, however, must show sympathy at all costs. It must render an account of some vital purpose in terms of its own self-justifying conviction, its esoteric profession of faith, its conscience. The gist of a gospel must ever be in its inward appeal.

Here, then, we have one, and indeed the chief, reason why we are bound to discriminate carefully between the kind of science that attempts to vindicate a value, and the kind that simply deals with it as a fact, or, in other words, sets out to explicate its historic content. While the latter is but an intellectual exercise, the former involves the combined use of intellect and feeling. Hence, whether he is fully conscious of it or not, every normative thinker is at heart a mystic. What the formalists call realism, meaning mere phenomenalism, will not suffice him when he seeks to portray the ideal as a real presence manifesting itself as such to those who surrender to its activating influence and yet can find it only in the act of continuing to seek it. Such a type of thinking cannot but be in the closest alliance with the life of action ; though the man of action is not to be identified with the hero of the history-books, the noisy man as one might say, but rather with any humble individual who tries to live the good life with all his might. The latter can, however, but do this according to his lights, and must therefore treat it as part of his duty that he be not deficient in illumination through any fault of his own. Here, then, in the supplying of such educative means as may be needed, lies the opportunity of the teacher of outstanding intellectual power, anyone, that is, who, whether ranking professionally as philosopher or preacher,

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poet or novelist, is a serious-minded and well-informed exponent of the art of good living. His special business is to strengthen the plain man's natural desire for good by directing it towards the more abiding satisfactions. Unless the bias were already there, nothing could be done to help ; so that the trainer must, as it were, be leaning over the shoulder of the actual player when he shows him how to improve his aim. If, on the other hand, he were merely to stand aloof and cry " bad shot ! " it is doubtful if he would succeed in being more than a spoil-sport. Hence, though criticism must enter into any examination of value on normative lines, it has at the same time to be a friendly criticism, because expressive of a supreme interest shared in common. Thus the Socratic method as applied to morals might seem on the face of it negative. Yet the purely zetetic side of the argument is throughout secondary to a dogmatic assurance that true wisdom will be found equivalent to complete goodness. Socrates always says in effect to his companion : " You and I are clearly at one in wanting the Good, so let us reason it out together what it is precisely that we do want."

Contrast any treatment of fact as such. It involves no affirmation of value at all except the trifling one, appealing primarily to the curiosity-hunter, that any curious bit of information is somehow worth picking up because at least it is always news. Strictly speaking, from the standpoint of pure science even the pragmatist contention that any piece of knowledge is bound to pay in the long run is not a relevant consideration in the study of fact for its own sake. On the other hand, this parsimony in the matter of its claim to throw a direct light on the desirable aspect of things renders the mind wonderfully cool in its bearings. The intellectual machine runs as smoothly as ever when at the bidding of the astronomers we contemplate the fading out of Man with the rest of the so-called biosphere from the face of an effete planet. Like certain bacilli, such notions are not killed off when they approach the zero-point of a moral temperature

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needing greatly to be raised before we can rejoice in being alive. Now some facts undoubtedly lend themselves better to this attitude of frigid detachment than do others. Inorganic matter, for instance, is further away from us than anything organic, because, however addicted we may be to what Mr. Ruskin calls the pathetic fallacy, brute nature must ever baffle any overtures in the way of intimacy on our part :

and still thought and mind
Will hurry us with them on their homeless march,
Over the unallied, unopening earth,
Over the unrecognising sea.

Since, however, fact as such implies the deadness of the fulfilled event, it ought to be theoretically possible to view anything given in history with the same indifference. Yet, as a matter of actual experience, it is far harder. Cæsar may be dust, but Cæsarism is with us still. Even Neandertal Man, a being of possibly another species, had ritual practices implying some belief in a life after death such as declare him a spiritual brother, and hence one to be regarded none too impartially but rather as we regard a backward member of the family. Nevertheless, the judgment of fact, in whatever application it is found at its best, will serve as the exemplar of as perfect an exteriorization of thought as is humanly attainable. It suggests a method whereby objectification can be effected in a degree incompatible with the effective exegesis of any teleological system. If we symbolize the indissoluble relation of subject and object by the combined letters SO, then, whereas big S and little o may stand for a normative truth, one that embodies mere matter-of-factness qualifies a large O with s as small as imagination will tolerate. By taking, then, the so-called positive sciences for our model, we sociologists are expressly adopting an exterior and, so to speak, unmoral attitude towards our subject. "No political axes ground here" is the notice over our door. If we would be social reformers as well, we must develop a double per-

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sonality. Nay, the more complete the dissociation between our two spheres of interest, the better sociologists we shall be ; though not necessarily the better men, unless with the aid of philosophy or religion we can afterwards pass on to a higher plane of thought. Thereupon one can take in the drama of life in the meaning it has, not for the mere scene-shifter, but for the actor as interpreter of the author's purpose. Let the sociologist, then, make a merit of being able to keep cool ; but it is only fair to remember that working in company with the out-of-doors staff is a chilly proceeding anyhow, and that his spiritual health may suffer unless he warms himself at the home-fire at the end of the day.

So far we have been dealing with a fairly conspicuous ground of disparity as between a valuation *per se* and a mere statement of fact about a valuation, consisting in the respective presence and absence of a practical interest, so that in the one case there can be friendliness and in the other neutrality. The next point of difference is, however, not so obvious, yet of sufficient importance to be worth more attention than, so far as I know, it has hitherto received. It is shortly this—that a normative treatment must be singly determined because it exhibits means in their due subordination to some all-embracing end ; whereas a treatment of facts in their diversity inevitably allows simplification to halt a long way short of unification. In other words, the one method professes to be absolute, the other is satisfied with relativity. The moralist who can assign no positive content to the good is soon convicted of having chosen the wrong vocation. A historian of morals, on the other hand, can provide a variety-entertainment without scandal. Now this obligation on the part of the teleological thinker to present his ideal in some one authentic shape and subject to no Ovidian metamorphoses is bound, in practice, to make for a certain narrowness. Normative systems rapidly become old-fashioned. Again, they do not amalgamate or grow out of one another, in marked contrast with the inductive sciences

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which welcome innovations as so much increment, and by so doing can maintain a continuous expansion. Granted that, in a highly conservative state of society, it might be deemed superfluous to issue more than one edition of the law :

But no ! they rubb'd through yesterday
In their hereditary way,
And they will rub through, if they can,
To-morrow on the self-same plan.

In a word, the static state is necessarily orthodox, the two conditions implying one another. When, however, we turn to a society such as our own, which can be termed dynamic, in the sense that it is not in equilibrium but in constant motion, whether this motion be but sheer change or amount to a genuine progress, then, to borrow from the artist his description of a well-known device for imparting vigour to his composition, the statesman must likewise learn " to keep it loose." To change the metaphor a little, the social reformer of to-day must not screw up the parts of his machine too tight, or, under the high power furnished by civilization, it will shake itself to pieces. Professor Bouglé,¹ in his interesting lectures on the evolution of values, makes what he calls " polytelism " the distinguishing mark of the modern community, no doubt thinking more especially of the type that is democratic and liberal. On the other hand, certain recent developments in Europe, whether they are to be regarded as reactionary or not, certainly place solidarity before liberty, even in the form of liberty of thought, that first and most precious article in the charter of a true civilization. Meanwhile, in this country at least, we know by experience that it is possible to agree to differ. Just as in private life we try to cultivate a sense of humour, so in politics we favour a spirit of toleration and compromise which, thanks to the individuality generated in the process, brings about intelligent co-operation, and leaves those who

¹ C. Bouglé, *Leçons de Sociologie sur l'Evolution des Valeurs*, Paris, 1929, ch. V.

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have the parade-ground habit of mind in a perpetual state of wonder how it is that such gay and giddy irregulars should so consistently manage to "muddle through." Nay, even in the sphere of religion, where, if anywhere, unanimity might be insisted on as the only way of making good a claim to catholicity, the multitudinous Protestant communions pursue their several paths without much effort to keep in touch, yet for all that with an unconscious sense of direction that allows a common advance ; while even within a particular body of worshippers schism is rare just because latitudinarianism is so general. In short, what Bagehot has termed the "Age of Discussion" has dawned for mankind so as to release him from that moral servitude which is exemplified by typical savagery. Under a régime of taboo a man cannot call his soul his own ; and perhaps in the circumstances he is better off if he does not know that a soul is included in his private possessions. Fortunately or unfortunately, however, the civilized man is no longer in this state of ignorance. Having once tasted of the tree of the knowledge of good and evil, he cannot but recognize a grovelling subjection to some external sanction, however speciously decked out with the insignia of authority, as an evil thing, the very negation of all self-development and true manhood. Thus we may suspect the wolf in sheep's clothing when we are bidden to acquiesce in so mutton-headed a doctrine of the higher possibilities of the social life. Having fought our way out of mere gregariousness, we are not going to be forced back into it without a protest, or, if it comes to it, a fight.

Yet any liberalism must always prove a stumbling-block to the normative thinker, because his treatment of the social and moral problem is bound by the logic of the situation to be authoritative through and through. His kind of truth cannot be proclaimed simultaneously by rival speakers aloft on their separate tubs. Whatever discords his instruments might produce if left to themselves, his special function is to extract from them some sort of concord. The chances are

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of course that, of all the sounds that nature and art between them can offer, his selection can utilize but a few. Nay, in the composition of such a symphony varying degrees of richness may be sought. The idealist attracted by the simple life might embody his conception of it in a Bach fugue ; whereas a Beethoven sonata might be more appropriate if justice must be done to the complexities of the city which, as Plato puts it, lives delicately. Meanwhile, in any case the given elements, scant or abundant, must be harmonized, or else the artist has failed in his purpose. Moreover, tastes differ ; so that the next musician will assuredly weave his notes together differently.

How, then, is the "polytelism" apparently so vital to the existence of the liberal type of modern society to co-exist with this "monotelistic" bent of the normative mind. Here, as it seems to me, is the great opportunity of Sociology. Studying the facts of the social life as it does without attempting to reconcile their inconsistencies, as these must appear to one who is called upon to choose between them, it testifies to the great variety of the possible satisfactions hitherto accessible to Man in the course of his long career ; though it always remains for the normative thinker to convert them into live options at his own discretion. On the other hand, I would protest with all my might against Durkheim's view that social facts as such can be "coercive." Such a deterministic interpretation of the pressure that they undoubtedly exercise on human wills, alike in their united capacity and as severally regarded, is a sheer piece of exaggeration more suited for a rhetorical than for a scientific context. We are not obliged by some iron necessity to abide by the language, the religion, the political system, into which we happen to have been born. However ready-made our convictions may seem to be, there is consent, tacit or explicit, at the very root of them, and hence also the possibility of dissent. Only an outmoded psychology, the associationism of a James Mill, might seek to explain any one of us as the passive product

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of his social environment. Nay, it would be more reasonable to fly to the other extreme, and to attribute a certain measure of autonomy to every living thing. For in its small way the merest bacillus makes a bid for the existence that suits it best ; and, though our intelligence may look down on its instinct, we do not always get the better of it in that essentially competitive larger society to which we both belong. It remains, then, for Sociology to present its social facts for what they are, namely, given conditions that at most have to be treated with more or less respect by those who would walk cautiously. These need to be as fully acquainted as possible with both the advantages and the dangers hitherto attendant on this or that line of advance ; though at the same time the thought should never be out of their minds that the obstacle of yesterday may be so readapted as to provide the bridge of to-morrow.

To put the matter in a different way, Sociology makes no affirmations about values, but so presents facts that they can be used for the criticism of values. Ideality by itself is not enough to commend a course of conduct in the eyes of those who have to make the best of this present world. Possibility must also be considered. Choice, though it always involves risk, need not be blind. The sociologist, however, leaves the estimation of his results in terms of choice to others, namely, the framers of ideals. His duty ends when he has surveyed the world from China to Peru, and shown how all sorts and conditions of men, in relation to social environments correspondingly various, have found it possible or impossible to live at all. He is not even required to show whether they have lived enjoyably in the given circumstances, because at that point there arises the question of what makes life worth living—a matter involving value-judgments not likely to be uniform the whole world over. These very judgments, however, in all their heterogeneity become facts as soon as they have taken effect, and so can be swept into the net of the sociologist as a most instructive part of his

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material. He can show, for instance, that this people opted for agriculture ; that another preferred the pastoral life ; that a third developed a taste for trade. In their subsequent histories, which it is the part of the sociologist to expound in the light of these leanings, there plainly lies a moral. Yet it is not for him to draw this, beyond stating that as a fact some prospered, while others were wiped out.

Thus the sociologist presides over a bazaar of social experiments, open to all customers to buy or not to buy as they please ; his business being simply to see to it that the goods displayed are so labelled that bankrupt stock can be distinguished from the products of some leading house. Now this same bazaar-metaphor was applied by Plato to a democracy because he discerned in that type of polity a polytelism of which, not having had the advantage of studying M. Bouglé, he thoroughly disapproved. But Plato as the most authoritarian of idealists, though he does not burke the problem of the possibility of his ideal state as something to be established firmly on earth and not merely set up as a pattern in heaven, does not find it any too easy to show how passive obedience on the part of the proletariat is to be conjoined with a liberal education for the ruling classes ; nor indeed is it apparent how a training on mathematical lines is to fit the legislator for dealing with the contingent. In any case Plato thought in hundreds, where we have to think in thousands and millions, of individual citizens, these having not only duties but rights, and more especially the right to self-determination. Let these countless numbers, then, be required to wear uniform on state occasions, if the authorities will have it so ; though the assumption is a little odd that patriotic hearts have to be worn on the sleeve. Even so, there is surely room also for sartorial licence in private life, even if at times it verges on eccentricity ; which, if by no means the equivalent of individuality, is at least the inseparable accident of the latter and hence symptomatic of its presence. In our sociological mart, then, where the pur-

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chaser is offered a variegated display of modes, ranging from genuine antiques to the latest novelty, while the choice rests entirely with himself, there are all the makings of a liberal education. At the same time we must not forget that it needs an educator to make a right use of these makings. If therefore the sociologist were to overstep his part and force his goods upon a gullible public, then indeed he would be in the employ of Beelzebub, the Chief Lord of Vanity Fair. Yet, as Bunyan allows, "the Way to the Caelestial City lies just through this Town." It is an inevitable incident in the pilgrim's discipline and progress that he should learn to rate sham merchandise at its true worth, and, though all the kingdoms of the world be shown him by way of temptation, should continue to gaze steadfastly ahead towards the journey's end. So much more noble, then, is the function, and so much greater the responsibility, of the thinker who would guide human choice than those of the historical student who merely provides choice with its materials, the bad with the good. Thus social facts, *pace* Durkheim, are not coercive. That can only be the attribute of a value to which we have, of our own freedom, vowed an absolute devotion. External nature stands for opportunity, never for sheer necessity; and this holds true even of human nature so far as it can be externalized as fact, because it has ceased to be, and has become but the heritage of the past. Coercive fact, then, like fate, is a bogey which can but dog the coward whose eyes are in his back. Internally viewed, moral evolution is rather a progress along the line of greatest resistance!

These considerations touching the relation of fact and value, and the types of social study that severally assign the precedence to these diverse yet ultimately complementary principles, might be extended to cover more points of difference; while so much again might be said by way of reconciling the two points of view. But I have thought it better to emphasize a few plain truths, if indeed they are as plain and true as I take them to be; trusting that nothing I have

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said will offend my fellow-sociologists, even if I may have occasionally seemed inclined to clip their wings. Yet, after all, we are *non solum Angeli sed etiam Angli*. Self-depreciation positively suits, I might almost say flatters, our national humour. It can do us no harm to remind ourselves that it is not for us as sociologists to lay down the law about how society should behave ; that so long as we are dealing with "is" we must try to leave "ought" entirely out of account. Cold comfort this, it will be said, for those of us who are likewise social workers. Not at all. Even the man of science can be a human being in his off-hours. It is simply a question of practising suspense of judgment in the form of the predication of a value, or in other words, the profession of a creed, so long as we are engaged in determining simply whether certain things have happened, and so, in proportion to the constancy of their recurrence, are likely to happen again. Sooner or later, however, the confessional attitude can be resumed with perfect propriety, and facts already duly attested can be re-examined and reinterpreted in the light of their relevance to the cause embraced. Any well-trained mind can be organized on the model of a court in which the functions of the witness-box and the advocate's bench are kept apart for the better enlightenment of the supreme faculty which delivers final judgment. Associated though we are with the votaries of the natural sciences, we sociologists can perhaps never hope to equal the magnificent impartiality of the experts whose evidence relates to the purely technical aspects of the case. For the party on his trial is Man, and, since therefore it is from the dock that we ourselves step across into the witness-box, we are inevitably testifying on the side of the defence, strive we never so hard to be honest. Yet stern Justice abominates perjury, and even tender Mercy would have the whole truth before it forgives. So let it be our special task to lay bare the family history in all its details, whether reputable or the reverse. The rest is for the judge and the court-missionary to decide between them.

THE PSYCHOLOGICAL BACKGROUND OF DICTATORSHIP

By DIANA SPEARMAN

THE modern revival of autocracy in Europe contains as one of its factors a definite psychological attitude towards the ruler. This attitude is characterized by (1) an attitude of acceptance towards the acts of the ruler,¹ and (2) the ruler appears to be the object of emotions, both stronger and more constant than those generally aroused by political personalities. These characteristics can be seen in the official propaganda, in literary writings by supporters, which cannot be called propaganda in the strict sense, and in descriptions contained in travel books. Examples from all these sources are given below.

Italy.—The proclamation after Mussolini's escape from assassination ran as follows :

"No reprisals.

"No demonstration either civil or religious.

"We must obey.

"Who fails to obey offends the Duce whom God has given and whom he now wants definitely to preserve intangible for the safety and greatness of our country.

"Signed : The Provincial Political Secretary."

"On the part of the writer this manifesto is no doubt rhetorical, but on the part of many a poor peasant these sentiments are quite genuine and express literally a religious conviction."²

"Mussolini is always right. One thing should be dear to you above all else, the life of the Duce,"³ is the instruction given to Fascist recruits. The prayer of the Avanguardisti begins with an appeal to God and ends with a blessing to

¹ I have used Mr. Bartlett's phrase "acceptance" instead of the better-known "submission" because of the emotional state which is implied in the latter.

² H. W. Schneider, *Making the Fascist State*.

³ "Almanaeco Scholastico" quoted in *The New Education in Europe*, by F. W. Roman.

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Mussolini, "In the adored name of Benito Mussolini may he be blessed" (del nome adorato di Benito Mussolini benedici).¹

Emilio Bordero has attempted to state the Fascist attitude to Mussolini in philosophic terms.² The basis of his argument is the value of individual personality as an end in itself. The great man of action, the typical "tyrant," enriches human life simply by his existence. "In the midst of all these meaningless survivals the tyrant asserted himself with the force of a prestige at once military and revolutionary; supported by the people, he bestowed on them the gift of his powerful humanity. . . . For men ardently longed to obey but felt now that they could offer obedience only to that which they could understand, that is, to one of themselves who would be able to justify his claims to command.

"Italy has been at all times the country of the individual, of man exemplary as such; not merely as a man of genius nor as a hero in Carlyle's sense of the word, nor as a representative man in the Emersonian significance of that term, but rather man as a type, as a perfect human product existing in his own right. . . . Mussolini is indeed the man in the Messianic sense, which I have already expounded, but he is also the exemplary Italian in whom the people finds its complete representative."

Turkey.—An extract from a Turkish writer: "The great chief has given his body and blood to the party exactly as the Messiah at the last supper said for the bread, 'This is my body,' and for the wine, 'This is my blood.' He who ransomed and saved the Turkish race from final destruction has given to his people, too, in written history of the seven years' struggle a political scripture which will become a symbol of their redeemed national life."³

An eyewitness has given a description of hero-worship: "The Gazi appeared on the lawn. As soon as these poor

¹ "Almanaeco Scholastico" quoted in *The New Education in Europe*, by F. W. Roman

² "The Fascist Dictatorship," in *Dictatorship on its Trial*. Ed. Forst de Battiglia.

³ Yacoub Kadri, quoted in Miss Ellison's *Turkey To-day*.

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peasants saw the object of their adoration they were frozen with awe and respect ; then clenching their cloth caps with sheer nervous tension, they ran up to the President, deposited their baskets of fruit before him, and talked stammeringly as if dazed by magnificence of something superhuman. . . . An old man wept as he held the basket of their humble offering to the Turkish hero."¹

"Thine was the arm that dragged us from the narrow passage which leads to death. We walk always in the lines traced by thee, our road is illumined by thy divine light."²

Poland.—"We might concentrate on a number of reforms carried out through this period . . . but we prefer to contemplate the man himself, his features, gestures, and deeds, standing out against the background of the history of his people and of the distracted and tormented continent of Europe. His figure is the embodiment of greatness, grace and heroism, combined with simplicity. . . . The virtue of centuries of magnificent examples has become lyric in his life."³

"Toute race aime s'incarner dans un héros. Pilsudski est ce héros légendaire, héros à la mode antique."⁴

Russia.—The same phenomena occurred in Russia, in spite of the doctrine of historic materialism, held as an article of faith by the Bolsheviks, which denies that individuals can have any influence on the progress of events. In spite of this, Trotsky said on the death of Lenin, "and now Vladimir Ilyich is no more. The party is orphaned, the workers class is orphaned—our party is Leninism in practice, our party is the collective leader of the workers. In each of us lives a small part of Lenin, which is the best part of each of us."⁵

An ardent communist gives a description of Lenin : "An impression of unspoken and unspeakable suffering was on

¹ Sidir Ikbal Ali Shah, "The Changing Face of Islam," *Journal of the Central Asian Society*, 1929.

² Milliet Nektebleri Kiraate, (*National School Reading Book*).

³ "Poland and Dictatorship," in *Dictatorship on its Trial*.

⁴ Carency, *Joseph Pilsudski*.

⁵ Trotsky, *Lenin*.

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his face. I was moved, shaken. In my mind I saw the picture of the crucified Christ. . . . Lenin appeared to me burdened, oppressed with all the pain and all the suffering of the Russian people.”¹

Trotsky attempts to reconcile Marxism and hero-worship : “We sing no higher being saves us and also no tribune ; that is right, but only in the historic sense, that is, in so far as the workers would finally conquer if there had been no Marx, no Lenin. The workers themselves would have perfected the ideas of the working class, but it would have been slower. . . . Lenin, the greatest executant of the testament, who not only trained the proletarian aristocracy, but trained classes and peoples in the execution of the law, in the most difficult situations, and who acted, manœuvred, and conquered.”²

The adoration of Hitler in Germany is too well known to require examples.

The question of the genuineness of such expression naturally arises here. It may be objected that these examples are tributes forced from a terrorized population or the extravagances of adherents. There appear to be several reasons for believing that such attitudes are the result of a genuine psychological impulse ; although of course in many cases there is an element of fear and flattery.

First the readiness of foreign observers who have nothing either to fear or to gain to share in the emotional experience of hero-worship seems to suggest that there is a satisfaction, at least for some minds, in such an attitude.

It is a Hungarian, not an Italian, who writes in the following way of Mussolini : “From the conflict of classes and parties, from the dramatic clash of capital and labour, from the chaotic tumult of the twentieth century, in the red twilight of the declining age has stepped forth—the man.”³

An Englishwoman on Kemal Pasha : “Yet the first impression Mustafa Kemal Pasha made on me must be

¹ K. Zetkin, *Reminiscences of Lenin*.

² Trotsky, *Lenin*.

³ *Il Duce*, by L. Kemenskey, trans.

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terrifying to the strongest nerves. As he folded his arms on his desk, leant forward and gazed at me with the strangest eyes ever possessed by man, Mustafa Kemal Pasha seemed as if he would see right down into one's very soul, and I was thankful indeed when the entrance of one of his ministers ended the strange contest of wills."¹

A Frenchman on the same theme: "Ces yeux du Ghazi: d'un bleu ardoise sous les grands sourcils blonds, on ne peut plus les oublier lorsqu'une fois ils ont croisés les vôtres. Un regard droit et clairvoyant qui pénètre les intentions secrètes, et si chargé de volonté que toute résistance semblerait une folie. Caressant ou hautain distant ou brillant d'ironie, il peut devenir implacable. J'ai vu des gens bouleversés par ce regard. Déjà ils étaient à la merci de Kémal, livrés tout entier à ce dominateur qui n'avait pas prononcé un mot."²

It is important to notice here the strong element of fear in these last two extracts, which must in fact be entirely fictitious, as the President of the Turkish Republic could obviously have no power of any kind over the writers.

A Russian on Pilsudski: "Quand le Maréchal entra dans la chambre, 'le vent silencieux' dont parle 'Le Livre des rois' souffla sur moi. Immédiatement j'eus cette impression. Oui, c'est lui le héros, 'ens realissimum,' 'L'être le plus real' de Nietzsche."³

The attitude appears secondly to be one which recurs in history. The impulse to see a human being as an incarnation of beneficent power is evident in the writings of individuals even in periods in which political tendencies have been most adverse to autocracy. Carlyle, in his lecture on the hero as king, says: "Find in any country the ablest man that exists there, raise *him* to the supreme place and loyally reverence him; you have a perfect government for that country. . . . It is in a perfect state; an ideal country. . . . What he tells us to do must be precisely the wisest,

¹ Grace Ellison, *Turkey To-day*.

² Roger, *En Asie Mineure*.

³ Demetri Merezhkovsky, *Joseph Pilsudski*.

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fittest, that we could anywhere or anyhow learn ; the thing which it will in all ways behove us, with right loyal thankfulness and doubting nothing, to do." It is doubtless true that autocracy has administrative advantages ; but the language which Carlyle used about the autocrat shows that his views on government were founded on the emotional desire for some such figure rather than on a perception of the technical merits of dictatorship. " The commander over men ; he to whose will our wills are to be subordinated, and loyally surrender themselves, and find their welfare in so doing, may be reckoned the most important of great men. He is practically the summary for us of all the various figures of Heroism ; Priest, Teacher, whatsoever of earthly or spiritual dignity we can fancy to reside in a man embodies itself here, to command over us, to furnish us with constant practical teaching, to tell us for the day and hour what we are to do."¹

It was Nietzsche who first expounded the doctrine of the great man " as an end in himself." " A new vast aristocracy based upon the most severe self-discipline, in which the will of philosophical men of power and artist tyrants will be stamped upon thousands of years."²

The hero myths which appear in so many parts of the world suggest that the fantasy of a beneficent, all-powerful saviour is one which arises in the minds of many peoples in the face of disaster. It is well known that many races have myths of heroes who are alleged to have conferred benefits on the tribe or race, benefits ranging from " civilization " to some special gifts. Such a hero was the Greek Prometheus, the Mexican Quetzalcoatl, and in a more primitive environment the American Indian culture heroes. A later development of this myth is that the hero is not dead, but is somewhere hidden or sleeping, and will arise again in the hour of his country's greatest need. This was apparently expected of Quetzalcoatl in Mexico even before the Spanish conquest, and

¹ " The Hero as King," in *Heroes and Hero Worship*.

² Nietzsche, *Der Wille Zur Macht*, vol. ii.

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the American Indians are said to have added this attribute to their culture heroes during their wars with the settlers. The same story has been told of historical or pseudo-historical figures, Arthur, Frederick Barbarossa, Wenzel of Bohemia, Harold, the last Saxon King, and many others. It is not only the existence of the myth which is interesting, but the ease with which the story becomes attached to historical figures, especially the national champion of a conquered people or to a personality who symbolized the aspirations of an oppressed class.¹ In England, the story has been told of Arthur, the ancient British hero, of Harold, of Owen Glendower, the Welsh Prince and of Monmouth. There was the beginning of such a legend in the refusal to believe that Kitchener was really dead. A similar story is alleged to have grown up about Enver Pasha among the Moslem population of Russian Turkestan.

The cult of the dictator in the modern State seems to have as its foundation the same impulse or impulses as the deification of the Hellenistic monarchs and of Augustus. It was long thought that deification was simply an extreme form of flattery ; but modern scholars believe it to have arisen at least in part from a genuine psychological impulse. Rostozeff considers that the writings of the Augustan poets, which have been called a propaganda bureau, reflected probably their own reaction to the settlement of Augustus, and certainly the feelings of the mass of the population.² He is convinced that the cult of Augustus grew up spontaneously and was not imposed from above.³

¹ It does not matter in this connexion whether the story grew independently in different parts of the world or was diffused from some common source.

² *Social and Economic History of the Roman Empire*.

³ Article "Augustus," in the *University of Wisconsin Studies in Language and Literature*, No. 15, 1922.

For Deification, see Bevan, E., *The Deification of Kings in the Greek Cities*, Eng. Hist. Rev. 1901.

"Deification" in *Encyclopaedia of Religion and Ethics*.

Tarn, W. W., *Hellenistic Civilisation*, p. 47-49.

W. S. Ferguson, *Legalised Absolutism en route from Greece to Rome*. Amer. Hist. Rev. 1912. Rostozeff, *ibid*.

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Deification is, of course, a complex attitude, and it is no doubt true that it was encouraged for political ends, assisted by the movement to fuse the different gods into one supreme deity ; and that the population was used to the idea of ascribing divine honours to men from the worship of (dead) heroes in Greece. But these factors decided the form which the adoration of the great saviour figures took ; the basis was the impulse to adore the beneficent power incarnated in the figure of an absolute ruler, strong to save and organize. The actual declaration that a human being is divine is forbidden by the mental habits of the modern, as it was sanctioned by the religious thought of the ancient world ; but the impulse expressed in this way, which seems so extraordinary to modern eyes, is the same which causes men to exalt the modern dictator.

The same type of doctrine appeared in Islam in the Shi'ite doctrine of the Caliphate. Orthodox Islam expressly forbids the attribution to the Caliph of any qualities beyond those of a temporal ruler, charged indeed with the mission of protecting the interests of the community and seeing that the religious law was carried out, but incapable of altering or even of interpreting the Law. The Shi'ites revolted from this conception ; while the Sunni Caliph was much less than a Pope the Shi'ite Caliph was much more. He himself incarnated " the divine light," he was himself divine. This doctrine took various forms to the different heretic sects, but the essential idea is the same in all.

The phenomena of " ruler cult " appearing in such widely separated periods suggests that men react to certain situations in the same way and that these reactions can be usefully studied by psychologists. The tone of the official propaganda itself suggests that there is a desire for a powerful and irresponsible ruler. It might have been supposed that apologists would have refrained from calling attention to the overwhelming position of the dictator. But instead of this, his all-pervading influence is, if anything, exaggerated.

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Associated with this is a demand for obedience. The people are, it is true, offered certain advantages, but in return they are asked to subject themselves to the uncontrolled will of the despot. "‘To obey’—that is the watchword, condemned and despised, which Mussolini has raised to the highest pinnacle— He has reasserted the joy, the dignity, the worth of obeying."¹

In Poland and Turkey, where the government is in form democratic, the statements of this policy are less blunt, but the figures of the respective "saviours" of these countries are even more all-pervading than that of "Il Duce" in Italy.

An explanation of authority and subordination has been sought in the hypothesis of two instincts: the instinct of submission, or, as MacDougall calls it, the instinct of self-abasement, and the instinct of self-assertion. These two instinctive tendencies are said to run all through human societies and to be found among the gregarious animals. But the behaviour said to exhibit this instinct has never been clearly classified. Below are examples of the varieties of behaviour that have been called submissive:

1. The passive acceptance of a leader without a previous struggle.
2. The passive acceptance of a leader after a previous struggle.
3. The active following of a leader—the leader being already imposed.
4. The active following of a leader—the leader being deliberately chosen.
5. The dependent attitude in religion.
6. The passive or feminine attitude in sexual behaviour.
7. Bashful behaviour or shamed behaviour.

An examination of these examples shows that they are not examples of one tendency. Between the passive acceptance of a leader and the active following of a leader there is a great difference. The mental state accompanying the one

¹ M. G. Sarfatti, *Life of Mussolini*.

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Freud lays great stress on the importance of the leader to a group; he explains this by the early experience of the individual. The individual is educated for society in the family, containing, as its most powerful member, the father. In this view early experience colours the whole of adult life, and the individual will, even when grown up, tend to seek the same solution of his difficulties as he did as a child. He will therefore tend to look to some powerful personality to save him from the dangers which may threaten him.

This theory accounts admirably for the existence of dictators, but neither Freud nor the instinct theories account for the change from democracy to dictatorship. It is clear that these changes do not arise only from the psychology of man, but from the effect of external changes on their psychology. It is, therefore, now necessary to turn to the situations in which dictators appear. The chief characteristic of these situations is that political events have become of enormous and obvious importance to individuals. In the typical situations the everyday life of the citizen is affected—he can see society as he has known it disintegrating, and there is also a vast, incomprehensible menace, an economic crisis or war. The fear which falls on people in such circumstances is a paralysing fear because the situation leaves no room for action. Any self-assertive tendencies are inhibited, because sources of information are not accessible to the ordinary person, he does not know what is happening, and if he did know, he would be incapable of understanding. How could the Turkish peasant understand the complications of the world situation in 1922?; the Italian, the economic crisis, the Russian, the famine, and civil war which swept over him? He is reduced to the position of a child in an incomprehensible world. But the child does have parents or at least grown-up people who are able to deal with the situation. In modern communities a person did appear who was able or seemed to be able to control the storm. It must be recognized that these men do really perform a function, and that, therefore,

there are what may be called rational grounds for gratitude and devotion. Mustapha Kemal did, in fact, beat the Greeks and Pilsudski the Russians, to take two quite uncontroversial benefits, and all these rulers preserve a certain framework for life. We must also remember that we accepted the autocratic leader as a basic type of organization and that when other forms fail a return to more primitive forms may be expected.

It is probable that a dictator owes very little to a conscious demand for domination. The emotional tendencies roused by the threatening political situation simply modify those attitudes which work against the acceptance of autocratic government. The dictator achieves his position by "political" methods, and generally by the use of force, but once having achieved power, a variety of psychological impulses are projected on to him. The chief emotional impulses which can be focused on to a political object are the emotions connected with the concept "power." These emotions fall into two groups which I propose to call, for the sake of convenience, "the political" and "the emotional" impulses; by political is meant those impulses which arise from the belief that the ruler will confer benefits on them, for example, the restoration of order. By emotional is meant those impulses which are not connected with any rational motive. For example, admiration—"hero-worship" is felt for the dictator in the same way as it might be felt for a prominent actor or sportsman. The emotions aroused by the political impulses are the dependent emotions, expressed by the psycho-analytic school in the father-child relationship. The reasons why the subject in a modern autocratic State tends to adopt this attitude towards the ruler have been indicated above. The emotional attitudes towards power are chiefly expressed in two attitudes—the pure desire for power, observed in a few ambitious individuals; and in contrast to this active attitude is the passive attitude which seems to be adopted by the majority of people. For them the

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concept power has a peculiar fascination ; this fascination may be felt either for the idea of power wielded by themselves or the idea of power wielded by another. This power "complex" has not been fully studied by psychologists and little is known about either its origins or manifestations. The desire for power seems to be present in all human beings. It may arise first as a tendency to assert oneself over one's environment. The random movements of babies are possibly an expression of this. Later on the child learns that pleasures of various kinds can often be obtained by self-assertion, and the tendency to self-assertion is fused with "positive self-feeling" or the "idea of the self" into a definite attitude towards power. That this in the young child is always a desire for power is suggested by an investigation undertaken by Miss Macaulay of University College, Exeter, into the nature of children's ideals. A questionnaire was issued to selected schools and colleges in Exeter. The basis of selection was to get samples of each of the more important social or economic groups. Among the questions asked were the following :

1. What person whom you have ever known or of whom you have heard would you most wish to resemble ?
2. Make a list of the reasons which made you choose this person.

Altogether 2,420 papers were received, 270 of them being written by students. 50.5 per cent. of the respondents gave as a reason for their choice the possession of power and wealth. The investigator says the enquiry "shows clearly that the supreme desire of children up to the age of 13 or 14 is for power." A curious point is that children give as their ideal the figures which are held up to admiration by their teachers, but not for the qualities which the teachers have pointed out as worthy of admiration. The typical reason for choosing Christ is that "He was very powerful," "He is the King of Kings, the Lord of Lords." The same kind of reasons are given for choosing the King. Children even "wrongly

attribute to their ideal the only qualities they can conceive of as desirable." 15 per cent. of the children gave the answer "to do good" as their reason, but this answer was given only by the elder children and looked suspiciously like a disguise for the desire for power.¹

It is clear that there are, for most people, very few opportunities for the exercise of power. What happens to the desire which appears to be so clear and well defined in the mind of the child? It can obviously seek such disguised outlets as the desire "to do good," but the opportunity to do good on a very striking scale is also absent. In morbid individuals a repressed desire for power can find satisfaction in petty cruelty, but the outlet is barred both by the moral feeling of the individual and the views of society. There are two possible ways of dealing with the repressed desire: it can be turned into its opposite, a pleasure in submission to the power of others, or the desire for power can retain its original form and be gratified by identifying oneself with a powerful personality. These two attitudes can be present in the same person and they can become fused with any of the other impulses or instincts.

A certain part of the propaganda is obviously designed to satisfy sadistic and masochistic desires. The type of personality presented in propaganda by all the dictators is curiously the same. The dictatorships of modern Europe are harshly repressive, nor is there any attempt to disguise this harshness, except for foreign consumption. The character of the dictator himself as displayed to the public invariably contains the quality of complete ruthlessness and even cruelty. "The character of Benito Mussolini may be described as cruelly sentimental. . . . His bad temper is evident on all occasions. . . . His large dark penetrating eyes seem full of perpetual anger."² In an article published in *Vakit* Mustapha Kemal denies that he is a despot, but adds: "Certes il nous est arrivé parfois de nous montrer

¹ *The Forum of Education*, June 1926.

² M. G. Sarfatti, *Life of Mussolini*.

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impitoyables à l'égard de ceux qui ont déchu en point de se montrer nuisible par leurs actes, leurs idées ou leurs personnalités, dans les affaires du pays. Nous sommes tout disposés à nous montrer sévères et implacables à l'endroit de ceux, etc."¹ Mussolini said: "The word 'Liberty' has been replaced by the words 'Order,' 'Hierarchy,' 'Discipline,' which are to-day the only words which exert a real fascination upon the fierce, restless, bold masses of our younger generation."²

The dictator is also supposed to be above the ordinary human affections. "He (Mussolini) calls no-one friend; no intimate friendship, 'a minimum of personal feeling' might almost be taken as Mussolini's rule of life." We are told by an admirer of Mustapha Kemal that no one has ever seen him laugh.³ The "iron" marshal of Poland enjoys much the same reputation. This sort of propaganda gratifies both sadistic and masochistic tendencies, the latter directly, the former through identification with the leader. Identification is assisted by propaganda which presents the dictator as the champion of the nation and as its most representative individual.

The desire for power and the desire for submission are in a normal period dispersed over a wide variety of objects. Under a dictatorship the dictator by his possession fills the whole scene, and therefore these tendencies are all focused on him. The same phenomena occur in the case of "hero-worship" in its ordinary sense. By this concentration on to one object the emotion is intensified according to the well-known observations on crowd emotions. It is clear also that the dictator takes something from religion; the similarity of the effusions quoted above to a certain sort of religious emotion is obvious. Besides his ability to gather up all the stray remnants of emotion, the ruler gets other support from

¹ *Souvenirs de Gazi Mustafa Kemal Pasha*. Trans. and Ed. Jean Deny.

² Mussolini, in a speech, quoted in *Mussolini the Man of Destiny*, Fiori.

³ "Mustapha Kemal." Rustem Bey, in *Revue de Geneve*, 1929.

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the fact that he is not only a personality but also a symbol. The value of a symbol is that it is both concrete and vague. Its concreteness focuses emotion, and its vagueness allows it to collect round it emotions which are really in conflict with one another; the most diverse aspirations may cluster round such an object as a national flag and lead to exactly the same behaviour if the flag is threatened. In monarchy and dictatorship the ruler is himself a symbol; he interprets and focuses the national sentiment as concretely as does the flag with the advantage of an added vividness. But the flag is only charged with emotion as symbolizing something else, whereas the man has value both as himself and as a symbol. People are encouraged to treat the dictator as a symbol—the conventionalized portrait of Mussolini found with the laurel wreath of the Roman Emperors really represents Mussolini as a symbol of the continuity of Italian history. The Poles are urged to see in Pilsudski an incarnation of the heroes of Polish romantic literature. The tendency is for these personality symbols to encroach on the ideas for which they stand, to attach to themselves as persons emotions which were first given to the ideas which they symbolize. It is clear that a man is a dangerous symbol; "left to themselves, symbols are barren facts."¹ But a man is not a barren fact; we tend to get an emotional reaction to a human being quicker than to an idea. The symbolic aspect of a ruler explains far better than any theory of racial psychology the tendency of Oriental peoples to return to some form of autocracy. The symbol relates always to past experience; people whose past experience contains only the autocratic ruler, whether as a reality or an idea, will tend to return to autocratic government until other conceptions have become familiar to them.

The points that have emerged are: (1) the likeness of the emotional attitude towards the ruler to the attitude in deification, in the Shi'ite conception of the Caliphate, in the ideas contained in the hero myth and in the conception of

¹ Whitehead, *Symbolism*.

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the ruler in the works of Carlyle and Nietzsche ; (2) there is in every human being a primary desire for power, which finds very small direct chance of gratification ; but it can also on the analogy of sadism and masochism find a satisfaction in submitting to the power of another ; (3) the situation in which dictatorship arises inhibits the self-assertive impulses and emphasizes the helplessness of the individual ; (4) a personality arises who saves, or is felt to save, the situation. The relationship of parent and child is revived, the emotional situation having been prepared by the previous inhibition of self-asserting impulses. Therefore emotions which may be described as dependent are felt for the dictator ; (5) this is helped by identification with the ruler. The individual feels that he shares in the glorification of a national hero ; (6) the same mechanism is realized by the impulses to power ; (7) this is assisted by the masochistic and sadistic tendencies which are gratified by the cruel aspect of dictatorship ; (8) these impulses fuse into a sentiment of hero-worship, which, as it is shared by so many people, becomes a crowd emotion and is thereby intensified. This hero-worship is strengthened by the symbolic aspect of the ruler ; people first make the ruler a symbol and then see him as the reality. This is partly due to mere confusion and partly to the superior attractiveness of human beings to ideas.

PHYSICAL ANTHROPOLOGY AND IGNORANCE IN GREAT BRITAIN

By G. M. MORANT

THE Swedish State Institute for Race Biology began its activities in 1922, and its Directors felt that their first need was for a comprehensive survey of the anthropological characters of the population with which they were to deal. Being a state-supported institution of a country which has a conscript service, there was little difficulty in obtaining access to sufficiently large numbers of subjects. More than 47,000 conscripts between the ages of twenty and twenty-two were examined, forming about half the total population for that age-group, and they were selected so that all regions and classes should be represented. It is taken for granted to-day that such an investigation must be carried out by quantitative methods if it is to be effective, and an elaborately prepared volume presenting the measurements obtained and the results of their treatment by modern statistical methods was published in 1926.¹ As a result of this survey there can be no doubt that we have a more complete knowledge of the racial constitution of Sweden than of any other country in the world. It was possible to compare the physical types of social (such as urban and rural) and occupational, as well as regional, groups and to estimate the extent of admixture with foreign peoples. Swedish workers claim to have originated this kind of national anthropological research, but the credit of having first emphasized its importance is due to Paul Broca, a French anthropologist.

In 1897 and 1898 nearly 46,000 Swedish conscripts had been measured,² though the methods used then were neither so comprehensive, nor so satisfactory in other ways, as those

¹ *The Racial Characters of the Swedish Nation*. Edited by H. Lundborg and F. J. Linders, Uppsala.

² G. Retzius and C. M. Furst, *Anthropologia Suecica*. Stockholm, 1902.

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of the more recent survey. It could be concluded that the average stature of the young adult male population of the country has increased by 13 mm. in about a quarter of a century. A repetition of the kind of investigation concluded in 1926 carried out thirty years hence, say, would obviously be of the greatest interest. It is only by such direct means that we can hope to discover the effect of changing conditions of life on the normal physique of a population and to give scientific validity to discussions such as those which centre round the question of presumed racial degeneration. Meanwhile, the Swedish State Institute for Race Biology has already completed a notable study of the demography of the Swedish Lapps¹ and it promises to conclude soon other investigations of a medico-biological character.

Although the idea is only one of comparatively recent origin, it is now generally recognized that a reliable knowledge of the purely physical differences of race is of great importance to workers engaged in problems of racial hygiene. But such a knowledge may well prove to be of value, also, to those concerned with other kinds of sociological problems. The question of race can seldom be ignored with safety when comparisons are made between different groups. The anthropological survey—like the census and vital and medical statistics—should form part of the framework, as it were, of sociological studies, and in so far as the framework is insecure the erection will lack stability.

In a memoir by a German anthropologist published in 1930² an attempt was made to collect together all the available anthropometric data relating to the past and present populations of Great Britain. The writer was apparently actuated by the belief that since no general survey of the region had been made, an approximation to one might be arrived at by the means he adopted. The fact that no British worker

¹ *The Race Biology of the Swedish Lapps*. Edited by H. Lundborg and S. Wahlund, Uppsala, 1932.

² *Zeitschrift für Morphologie und Anthropologie*: Band XXVIII, "Die rassischen Verhältnisse in Nordeuropa," by Walter Scheidt.

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had attempted the task might have warned him against such a course. The bibliography presented is extensive and it appears to be nearly exhaustive, but it cannot be claimed that the object with which it was compiled was achieved, or even that any new results were derived from the compilation. The haphazard way in which most of the original data had been collected, the insufficiency of its volume, the lack of standardization in matters of technique and other defects obviously made it impossible to reach any final conclusions. No intensity of research could compensate for the inadequacy of the evidence. The only really definite result which a cautious reader might derive from this study is that so far as the racial constitution of the modern population of Great Britain is concerned the obvious need is for new facts rather than for any further discussion of the few already established. If such a reader was previously unacquainted with the literature, he would be surprised to find that so little had been done here in a type of enquiry which has already been carried far in other countries. It is not without reason, perhaps, that British sociologists ignore the aid which their anthropological colleagues should be able to provide.

The history of the ideas which have been held at different times regarding the racial constitution of the population of the British Isles furnishes a good example of the impermanence of widely accepted beliefs. It shows that there are few who can resist the temptation of accepting insufficiently established conclusions—in order that their ideas on a particular subject may be definite and usable—rather than suspending judgment in default of sufficient evidence. To go no further back than the middle of the nineteenth century, it would have been rank heresy then to maintain that practically nothing was known about the racial history of England. Almost everyone whose opinion on the question was most valued would have agreed that certain kinds of information available could resolve it quite satisfactorily. The evidence referred to would be that furnished by certain early historical writings—principally

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Roman and Anglo-Saxon—and by the still infant science of comparative philology. The possibility of obtaining other kinds of evidence which might throw a more direct light on the subject was unsuspected. The usual methods had led, it was supposed, to certain general and positive conclusions which must be accepted by all reasonable people, though many details of the picture were admittedly obscure and different specialists chose to elucidate these in different, but still confidently expressed, ways. By the time of the Norman Conquest a number of different peoples of diverse racial origins had become established in different parts of Great Britain and, since there was no later immigration of any consequence, it was asserted that their descendants have the same general distribution in modern times. Having decided this matter in his study, the historian or philologist might go on to examine the inhabitants of different parts of the country, and he seldom failed to find that his conclusions were thereby confirmed. Interesting coloured maps were prepared to instruct the uninitiated in these matters.

The problems of British ethnography were complicated considerably when, as a result of the first systematic excavations, a certain number of the skeletons of the inhabitants of the island in late prehistoric times became available for study. Types which appeared to be different from those of any races known to the historians were found among these, and the possibility that the earlier strains had modified the later ones by intermixture had to be admitted. Another new method of approach was due principally to the French school of anthropology led by Paul Broca. This was a direct examination of the existing population by means of measurements of the head and body and by recording the colours of hair, eyes, and skin in order that accurate estimates of regional differences might be obtained. Those who first suggested this kind of enquiry insisted on the need for dealing with large numbers of individuals if results of permanent value were to be reached. Unfortunately the warning was not heeded

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by the British anthropologists who began to collect measurements of their countrymen. They worked in isolation and none of their researches in this direction were long continued. A certain amount of more or less exact information relating to the modern population of Great Britain accumulated, but it had been collected in an unsystematic way and a good deal of it is practically valueless when judged by present-day standards. It is not to be wondered at that the anthropologists lacked confidence enough to attempt any interpretations in terms of the new data only. They supposed that they were on much firmer ground in attempting to show how their measurements could lend support to the familiar theories which had been formulated by the historians and philologists. Literary hypotheses, which could hope for no further confirmation from literary sources, were apparently to receive it from scientific description. At this stage there were few bold enough to suggest that the new evidence was inadequate in volume and quality either to lead to new conclusions of any value, or to give valid support to any previously postulated. The possibility that when these new data had accumulated sufficiently it might be found that they could not be reconciled with the older hypotheses was not contemplated.

Since 1900 the fashion has changed. By studying large quantities of data relating almost exclusively to the living populations of European countries—few having been so neglected from this point of view as Great Britain—a number of anthropologists (notably Risley) were led to formulate certain general conclusions concerning the racial constitution of the continent as a whole. Three main stocks were distinguished, known as the Nordic, Alpine, and Mediterranean. This conception was widely accepted, though it still lacks anything approaching rigid scientific support, and it is current to-day. The data available for British peoples alone were obviously too meagre to have suggested any such generalization, but they were made to fit into the wider

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scheme. All three of the principal stocks are generally recognized as having been represented in Britain at different periods, and all three are often supposed to have survived, though intermixed, until to-day. The manner in which they were crossed and the extent to which their representatives have survived became fertile matters of controversy on which no two writers agree exactly. There has, however, been an increasing tendency to employ anthropological rather than historical terms in discussion of this kind, although no change in nomenclature could possibly compensate for the paucity of the known facts.

The anthropological, as apart from the historical and literary, study of ethnography derives its material from two main sources. The most direct evidence of the physical characters of past peoples can only be obtained—unless the circumstances are very exceptional—from their skeletal remains. British anthropologists have paid a good deal of attention to this branch of their subject in recent years, and their researches are not less advanced than those of their continental colleagues who deal with past populations of their own countries. The chief difficulty here is in obtaining sufficient material, for it is clear that a considerable number of samples, each of a sufficiently large size and associated with different cultures, are needed in order to arrive at anything approaching a complete survey of the racial history of a particular region. The co-operation of the archæologist is required, and all the skeletons which he excavates should be preserved, since the source from which they are derived is by no means inexhaustible. It has been estimated that if building proceeds at its present rate there will be no further archæological material of any value to be found in the City of London fifty years hence. Yet it may be doubted whether a fiftieth part of the skeletons, other than modern, dug up there in the present century has been preserved for purposes of scientific study. There are none in the British Museum. Much remains to be done in this country before it will be

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possible to trace with assurance the origins and descent of the present-day population.

The other source of material is always at hand, since it consists of the total population of the region considered, living at a particular time, and a study of their physical characters, apart from all question of origins, is of more interest to the sociologist. This material is practically unlimited in extent, but it is not always easy to gain access to sufficiently large, or randomly chosen, samples of it. The national anthropometric surveys carried out in other countries have generally been confined to conscripts, and that group is a suitable one in many ways. The most unfit and undersized are probably excluded, but otherwise there will usually have been little selection in forming it. The members of a small regular army, such as our own, will, however, represent a far more stringently selected group, and their characters will give no fair indication of the means and variabilities of the total population. It may not be easy to obtain random samples representing different regions of England, say, but such might be collected in several different ways.

The fact that the anthropometric studies of the modern British population are totally inadequate would not be denied by any anthropologist. Individual workers have, indeed, furnished useful data in recent years relating to certain small areas, and Wales and Scotland have hitherto received more attention than England. Their isolated efforts have necessarily been extremely limited, and it must be admitted that we know considerably less about our own countrymen, from the point of view considered, than about the primitive native races of many countries such as Greenland and California. It has recently been announced that Harvard University proposes to send an expedition to conduct a comprehensive anthropological survey of Ireland in the near future. Must we wait to receive outside help? Six trained observers working for two years, and given suitable facilities, could adequately investigate the physical consti-

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tution of the British population, and greater efforts than that are often expended to obtain less important results. Such a survey is bound to be useful to enquirers in many fields, and while it is lacking the labours of physical anthropologists are likely to remain neglected in this country. The source of our "national character" has recently been a topic of discussion, and once again the historical evidence has been brought forward, though it is now believed to demonstrate that we are not of pure racial origin as some historians had supposed fifty years ago. But whether, and to what extent, there has been racial mixture in Great Britain in the Christian era, say, is in fact a matter of the vaguest speculation at present. An adequate anthropometric survey could alone resolve that problem satisfactorily. And such an undertaking would be of far more than academic interest, for its conclusions would have to be constantly referred to by many engaged on the practical aspects of racial hygiene. Questions of origins may not interest sociologists, but they cannot ignore the physical differences found between different classes, or other groups, of the community. Interpretation of data relating to selected samples almost invariably requires a knowledge of the characters of the normal unselected population, and to establish that should be our first concern.

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NATURE AND NURTURE. By Lancelot Hogben. *Williams & Norgate*, 1933. 6s. 6d. net.

This book is the substance of the William Withering Memorial Lectures delivered last year in the Faculty of Medicine of Birmingham University. Into five short chapters, less than 150 pages all told, including the valuable appendices, is compressed the fruit of solid thinking, and few students of the subject could read them without adding something to their store of knowledge and gleaning fresh ideas as to the most promising lines for research in this specialized field. It is intended as an introduction to the more recent methods of genetical science as applied to human kind, and an attempt is made to explain these in a manner that shall be intelligible to the general reader. The reader who is mathematically inclined will feel that it fulfils its purpose admirably. It is to be feared, however, that those with only slight mathematical equipment will find it "heavy going" in places, and it is made no easier for them by occasional misprints—five may be discovered in one short table on p. 63. Such a sentence, too, as "What would be the result . . . if consanguineous marriages were encouraged more than we do at present?" on p. 65, makes one wonder whether the author corrected the final proof sheets himself. But errors of this kind may easily be overlooked by any writer who, in striving after perfection, amends and re-amends his manuscript: they are not of the essence of the matter. The sparkling and incisive style so characteristic of the author makes the less technical portions of his work exciting reading. Though he maintains a scientific temper in presenting both sides of the case for, and against, heredity and environment—or in expounding the impossibility of disentangling them in the present state of our knowledge—he leaves no doubt as to the side to which his own sympathies lean. He tilts most engagingly, and all who have a sense of humour, whatever be their genetic creed in the matter, are sure to enjoy his thrusts at the single-minded eugenist.

It is pointed out that the science of human genetics is beset with special difficulties because people cannot—we are almost tempted to say "unfortunately cannot"—be mated merely for observation purposes; and, even if they could, the resulting offspring, if any, would take years to develop to maturity. The reader will be well advised to hurry through the introductory pages of the book, where the author discusses in general terms the kind of problem which can and which can not be solved by genetic principles, and return to them after mastering the contents of Chapter II, because certain fundamental results which are used in de-

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veloping the general argument in the first chapter are only proved in the second. It is worth remarking that these results assume that mating occurs at random and, while the author is clearly aware and indeed has been at pains to expose some of the limitations involved in this assumption, it may be doubted whether he has sufficiently stressed a qualification of another kind which may limit simple and direct applications of the theory. It cannot be assumed that the fertility rate is necessarily the same for all types of mating. Although actual and potential fertility are not synonymous, and although social class is not a genetical entity—and it is difficult to define it with scientific precision—the well-attested fact of a difference in the number of children actually born in different social classes makes one question the validity of the assumption without proof, and proof is difficult to establish either way.

The qualifications mentioned, however, do not make the mathematical theory worthless. The theory is most valuable as a guide to general tendencies, and several cases are cited in the book where there is a remarkable agreement between theory and observation. A good example of this occurs in the chapter devoted to an examination of the consequences of inbreeding. One important practical conclusion which followed from the principle of random mating was that rare recessives are seldom themselves the parents or the offspring of recessives, but theory suggests and observation confirms the discovery of an exceptionally high proportion of individuals exhibiting certain rare recessive traits among the offspring of marriages between cousins or other near relatives.

There follows an interesting and useful application of the theory of probability to test the familial incidence of conditions determined by gene substitutions unaffected by differences of environment of a kind to which members of the same fraternity are commonly exposed. When the condition results from a single recessive gene substitution, it is necessary to make allowance in the estimate for families which contain no recessive offspring though both the parents are carriers. There are no means of identifying such families by any external signs, but here again the mathematician proves equal to the occasion. Incidentally, there is a statement in the first paragraph of this chapter which might be misunderstood: "Thus diseases determined by rare recessive genes belong to the class which are called by clinicians 'familial' in contradistinction to 'hereditary,' diseases." If the two words be used, as here, in such a way as to suggest that the conditions are antithetical, then the use is surely misleading. The reference in the passage quoted is to children in the same family who exhibit a recessive trait, being the offspring of heterozygous parents who do not themselves exhibit the trait. In that case the condition is, by hypothesis, both familial *and* hereditary.

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The last chapter contains a criticism of the application of the technique of correlation to problems of heredity and environment. Here doubt is cast upon some of the conclusions reached by Professor R. A. Fisher ; of his mathematical analysis the author writes respectfully : the discussion of the interpretation to be given to the results of the analysis, however, is shrewd and will no doubt evoke a reply from the proper quarter in due course.

To readers who wish to get a clear impression of the methods which Professor Hogben advocates for attacking certain important types of problem arising in human genetics, and especially to those who themselves intend to apply such methods, there is no better introduction available than is provided in these lectures.

D. CARADOG JONES.

WHY WAR ? Correspondence between Albert Einstein and Sigmund Freud. International Institute of Intellectual Co-operation. *League of Nations*, 1933. 4s. 6d.

WAR, SADISM AND PACIFISM. By Edward Glover, M.D. *George Allen & Unwin, Ltd.* 3s. 6d.

The correspondence between Einstein and Freud will, as Freud hints, prove a disappointment to those who expect the world's discontents to be removed by some psychologist's Rumpelstiltskin. Einstein is very warm to the hidden ill when he surmises that man has within him a lust for hatred and destruction which he, Einstein, imagines is usually latent, but easily aroused. That leads him to ask whether these hate impulses cannot be controlled. He gets still warmer in his conclusion, when he directs attention not only to international conflicts but to civil wars or the persecution of racial minorities. You have hit it, Freud says, Man has within him an active instinct for hatred and destruction. He gives a brief outline of the psychoanalytical theory of instincts—Love and Hate—or the appetitive and reactive instincts “perhaps another of those eternal polarities, attraction and repulsion, which fall within your (Einstein's) province.” If popularly but rather crudely we identify the reactive hate and destructive impulses with the instinct of self-preservation, we can follow Freud when he asserts that the turning of the destructive impulse towards the external world must be beneficial. It is, indeed, all that we mean when we talk of man's conquest over nature. Man cannot suppress his aggressive tendencies unless he ceases to be man. Freud regrets as vain the communists' thesis that economic equality will abolish the aggressive impulse. The instinct can be canalized and so made less dangerous. Among his tentative suggestions are (1) the cultivation of the ties of affection between man and man, either by desexualized love

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or by community of interest ; (2) the formation of a class of independent thinkers " inaccessible to intimidation and in the quest of truth ! " Vain faith and courage vain in these days of Bolshevism, Fascism, Nazism.

Turning from these uncertain chances, Freud reminds his correspondent that they are both born pacifists. " With pacifists like us it is not merely an intellectual and affective repulsion but a constitutional intolerance, an idiosyncrasy." The psychoanalyst finds it idle or impossible to speculate how and when the rest of mankind will follow suit ; we are reminded that it is the so-called intelligentsia that gives way most readily to war and hate.

Culture is attended with a strengthening of the intellect, of reason, and a turning away from the aggressive impulses, not a one-sided blessing. Freud assures us that whatever makes for cultural development is working against war. But this seems rather in the nature of a pious belief than based upon the facts that he and Einstein adduce.

Edward Glover is less disposed than Freud to believe that concentration of peace propaganda on ethical or economic arguments can ever achieve its object. Pacts, disarmaments, treaties, do not touch the fundamental problem. Propaganda for war and propaganda for peace are not antithetical, but on the contrary both find their drive in similar unconscious mental processes. Listen then to the voice of the psychoanalyst. The author gives a brilliant exposition of the aggressive destructive impulse and its ramifications in the life of man. Since a pure culture of the fundamental impulses love and hate is never found, but always a blend of the two, the analyst in practice is concerned with the problems of *unconscious* cruelty directed towards other men—sadism—and *unconscious* cruelty directed inwards towards the self—masochism.

These impulses develop in the child from a fantastic—that is unreal—relationship to and ideas about its first human environment. The fantasies which people the child's world as a world of dangerous enemies by whom it is in fear of being attacked—whom it in turn does attack—is never wholly lost by the growing touch with the realities of the world. Something of this hostile world remains in the adult as a permanent possession of the unconscious. These unconscious impulses are held in check by the primitive unconscious conscience. The control is uncertain and unequal. The unconscious impulses are ever liable to break through and frequently do. In their daily relationships men show the effects of these savage impulses—cruelty and unkindness to others and to themselves, inferiority feeling, and all that kind of thing. On the grand scale we have here the common source of the pacifist and the militarist. War is born in the nursery, and perhaps it is here that it must be laid to rest. Those who are serious will recognize that there is no short cut to abolish

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war although something might be done to make the intervals between wars longer ; the investigation of the problems means the investigation of all the problems of child-adult development and the methods of successful repression of primary instincts that civilization has necessarily curtailed.

Glover regards the problem as so serious that he proposes planned research extending over periods of 5, 15 and 50 up to 1,000 years, giving us a sketch of the proposed investigations and suggested procedure. I have heard people laugh at the idea of these long periods of investigations. Long ? How old is man ? How old is civilization ?

War, the psychoanalysts believe, is only very partly made by the politicians and the soldiers. We pacifists, militarists and indifferentists alike are the makers of wars ; every one of us has these destructive tendencies and every one of us is liable to have these tendencies displaced on to another nation or race or tribe. As to a 1,000 years. For a thousand years in thy sight are but as yesterday.

M. D. EDER.

SELBSTMORD UND TODESFURCHT BEI DEN NATURVÖLKERN. By Dr. J. Wisse. *W. J. Thieme & Cie, Zülphen*, 1933.

Suicide among primitive peoples occupies a different moral and legal position than among ourselves. The tendency of a Polynesian "to depart from scenes of personal shame," as it has been expressed, leads frequently to an act of virtual self-immolation—as setting oneself adrift in a canoe on the open ocean, where there is small chance of survival. Such conduct may be regarded as stupid ; more often it has the sympathy of the rest of the community. It is not stigmatized as immoral, or criminal. Judgment is passed much in the sense of the old maxim of the Stoics : "Mori licet cui vivere non placet." The taking of one's own life may, in fact, even serve as part of the process of law. And even in the Japan of to-day, in spite of the infiltration of Western ideas, suicide of the traditional type in patriotic protest against what is conceived as an offence against the national dignity is received with popular acclaim. There is then a very fruitful field for investigation of the subject, involving attention to moral, legal, religious, and political norms.

As compared with the works of Steinmetz, Durkheim, and Morselli, the book of Dr. Wisse, though less stimulating, rests on a broader inductive basis. Beginning with a definition of suicide as a positive or negative act of a mentally clear person who in free choice accomplishes his own death, he goes on to a regional consideration of the subject, analysing in each case the social background against which the events occur. Here he has ranged through an exhaustive series of data, the value of which is unfor-

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tunately often hardly equal to his industry. Since the observers whose records are utilized very rarely gave any special attention to the problems of suicide, the conclusions which Wisse draws from his tabular material, particularly in the sphere of motive, are subject to a wide margin of error.

With this qualification one can admire his careful, thorough analysis of an immense quantity of evidence, and the clarity and moderation of his general propositions. He divides the motives for suicide, so far as they can be ascertained, into nine groups, and discusses the relative importance of each, then maintains the balance very judiciously between the psychological and sociological factors involved. He establishes the fact that there is little condemnation of suicide among primitive peoples in general, and correlates the frequency of the practice with their slight fear of death, and to some extent with their belief in a pleasant hereafter. That the greater number of suicides in native communities occur among women he attributes cautiously in part to their less happy conditions of life and in part to the "greater emotionality" of the female sex.

RAYMOND FIRTH.

THE UNEMPLOYED MAN. A Social Study in Britain To-day. By E. Wight Bakke. *Nisbet*, 1933. 10s. 6d.

This book places all who are interested in unemployment deeply in Dr. Bakke's debt. It will appear to them extraordinary that a piece of investigation of such profound importance should have been left, notwithstanding our thirteen years of depression, for an American. They will find some consolation in the fact that Dr. Bakke has done his work so well.

The book is the record of an enquiry into the effect of unemployment insurance on the willingness and ability of British workers to support themselves. Dr. Bakke, wisely advised by Professor Hilton, determined that the best way to find out about the British workman was for the time being to turn into one. He did so. He lodged among workers in Greenwich, drank beer, went to chapel, talked and played and looked for jobs with them. In these ways he came to know them and to learn their mind, not only on the subject of his special study. He is able to give us as complete a picture as possible of the "background and foreground" of the life of a man out of a job. On the whole, it is not a reassuring picture.

The "background and foreground" of life for wage earners in Greenwich is depressing and drab. On men whose standards were already constricted and meagre unemployment has come down like a plague. Dr. Bakke is able to make us feel the tragedy involved in the rejection of workmen, the rapidity with which they lose industrial quality, and their desperate fight against the suggestion, true, in so many cases, that their old occupations have no longer a place for them. The shiftiness and

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subterfuge of workmen in receipt of transitional payments become in Dr. Bakke's explanation easy to pardon and understand.

The relationship of the unemployed to the employment exchange and his attitude towards and behaviour under the Employment Insurance Acts are the main matter of the book, and all that Dr. Bakke has to say on these subjects is of great value. On the whole, he is satisfied that the British workman is not guilty of malingering and work-dodging. He is one further witness to the invaluable services rendered by insurance, and he gives what is no doubt as nearly as possible a precise judgment on the way in which the worker regards it. What will surprise many readers is Dr. Bakke's picture of the British workman as a person of simple mind who regards his destiny as in the hands of powerful outside persons whom he partly fears and partly believes in and to whom he inclines on balance to leave the business of government.

On the worker's home life, on his attitude to politics and religion and the machines and the women who he thinks deprive him of employment ; on the differences between skilled and unskilled workers and on a variety of other questions of very great importance, Dr. Bakke has much to say, and in saying it he is always suggestive and frequently original or profound. His book may be commended without any hesitation whatever.

J. J. MALLON.

THE DEVELOPMENT OF SOCIAL INSURANCE AND MINIMUM WAGE LEGISLATION IN GREAT BRITAIN. By Helen F. Hohman. *Houghton Mifflin Co.*, 1933. \$3.50.

Social legislation in Great Britain belongs to recent history. Miss Hohman emphasizes the awakening of the public conscience at the end of the nineteenth century and the subsequent concentration of British reformers on forms of insurance. These insurances, against old age, widowhood, sickness, unemployment, she describes with fullness and precision and without failing to point out what is particularly good or bad in each. She is concerned too with the social consequences of the conditions which these insurances have created and considers judicially what is to be said for and against them.

Miss Hohman does not deal with the defects of the British scheme of insurance as a whole : its failure, for example, to insure the worker against death or the impaired earning capacity and heightened requirements of middle age. She does not measure it as a scheme against the schemes of other countries or against any ideal scheme. Her description and evaluation of each item in the scheme is fair and balanced and entirely competent.

In a final chapter Miss Hohman deals with minimum wage legislation

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in Great Britain, that is, with the Trade Boards Acts. The chapter is, however, slight and perhaps unduly emphasizes the condition of sweating, which at their inception the Trade Boards were intended to remove. As British readers know, the Acts are now applied to trades against which no allegation of sweating has been made, for example boot and shoe repairing and cutlery, and are to be regarded not merely as a device for remedying under-payment but as a means of regulating wages and creating industrial good order.

J. J. MALLON.

THE SPIRIT OF THE OXFORD MOVEMENT. By Christopher Dawson. *Sheed & Ward*, 1933, pp. 144. 3s.

The author of this book has so well-founded a reputation, that I read this small volume with keen expectation, and have not been disappointed. In the limited space at his disposal, he gives a lucid, discerning and appreciative account of the chief actors in the ecclesiastical and theological drama which is now being so widely commemorated, and the crucial importance of which for the religious thought and life of the Christian Church must be fully recognized, whatever one's own personal attitude to it may be. Inevitably Newman holds the centre of the stage, but the influence of Hurrell Froude is more fully recognized than in the less instructed popular judgment. A sketch is given of the Anglican Tradition, and an account of the two leaders, Keble and Froude, who specially represented it but who also forged "the first links of the chain which was to draw the Anglican tradition out of the rut of conventionality and Erastianism" (page 24).

Newman brought into the movement the Evangelical Tradition. While the author recognizes the value of that tradition, he is in my view too harsh in his judgment of its defects. The comparison with contrast that he makes between the Calvinistic and the Catholic tradition deserves quotation: "Calvinism agrees with Catholicism in its three fundamental principles—the supernatural order, the supernatural society, and the supernatural life. But it interprets these principles in a spirit of sectarian rigidity which entirely alters their meaning. Calvinism, like Catholicism, accepted the Augustinian theology of grace, but divested it of its mystical and sacramental elements. Hence its ethical ideal acquired the harsh and unamiable features that made Puritanism so unpopular. Hence too, the bareness of its liturgy and the aridity of its dogmatism. Above all, its assertion of the complete corruption of human nature destroyed the Catholic hierarchy of nature and supernature and substituted a sharp dualism which led to the impoverishment of culture and to the narrowing of the intellectual outlook of Calvinism" (pp. 29-30). This quotation indicates very succinctly the author's own standpoint as a Roman Catholic, although for the most part he writes very objectively.

From this point on it is Newman's development which becomes the dominant interest, although the other tributary influences are not neglected. The significance of the Mediterranean Journey as bringing to him the heavy burden of the sense of his vocation is fully recognized, and clearly described. The fulfilment of that vocation by Newman,

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influenced by and influencing his friends Keble and Froude, provoked not only external hostility and opposition, but also division internal to the movement itself. The Apostolicals were no longer concerned about preserving the Anglican traditions as were the Conservatives, such as Palmer, but sought the recovery of the Catholic tradition of the early centuries of the Church. "The Tracts for the Times" launched the movement on the parlous and raging sea of controversy, in which Newman had to pilot the ship with greater caution than was congenial to his friend Froude, who, however, was willing to submit to his leadership. Newman was still striving to find the *Via Media* between Roman Catholicism and Protestantism.

In this "he laid the foundations of a new theology for the Church of England, which has had an incalculable influence on the development of modern Anglicanism and which perhaps still remains the best justification for the essential Anglican position" (p. 102). The claim Newman made for this mediating theology was this: "Rome had added to it, Protestantism had subtracted from it, only in the Church of England was there to be found the safe middle way of Catholic orthodoxy—the Apostolic Church and the Faith of the Fathers" (p. 103). At this stage of his development, Newman was still opposed to Rome. "Papacy must be destroyed: it cannot be reformed" (p. 105). But the rejection of this theology by the bishops, the disappointment of his hopes, combined with the influence of Froude, who was near the end of his life, was bringing about a change in his attitude: "His abandonment of the *Via Media*, far from being a sudden flight, was a slow and hard-fought retreat in which he stubbornly contested each inch of the ground" (p. 114). The conflict in his mind for ten years "between the static and the dynamic conception of Catholicism" found "definitive solution in *The Essay on the Development of Christian Doctrine*" (p. 115). With good reason has Newman been held in some measure responsible for Roman Catholic Modernism; this bridge which he built for himself can scarcely claim the approval of the Christian *pontifex*.

The Anglo-Catholic movement, which was thus losing Newman, found an influential supporter in Dr. Pusey, whose prominence in it has led to the nickname "Puseyites" and dubious reinforcement in the publication of Froude's *Remains*, by which Ward was converted to the movement. Meanwhile, Newman was moving away from his own dogmatic conception of the Church to that of "a supernatural order realized in the spiritual life of the individual Christian and in the corporate reality of a Divine Society" (p. 125.) The Church of England having failed him, he sought and found refuge in the Roman Catholic Church.

The author follows his career no further, as his purpose does not require him to do. But as one reads one may ask: Did he there find all he sought? Two sentences from the Conclusion may be quoted as giving the author's own position: "In the case of a man like von Hügel, we feel at once that he was no true Modernist, however much he may have shared the views of the Modernists in critical matters, because he whole-heartedly accepted the dogmatic principle of Catholicism—the existence of a divine Truth and a divine Authority to which the human mind and will must conform

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themselves" (p. 135). One may ask if that was the reason why he escaped the papal censure which fell on the Modernists, or was there a reason of policy rather than principle? As regards the Anglo-Catholic movement itself, the author regards the intrusion of the modernist intellectual element as likely to be its undoing unless there is a return to "Catholic intellectual principles" (p. 141). He himself recognizes no possible reconciliation or compromise between modernism or liberal Protestantism and Christianity as embodied in Catholicism. Much as I as a liberal Protestant disagree from the author's own standpoint, and the movement he has so excellently described and appreciatively estimated, I can recommend his work as an interesting and valuable contribution to a subject now commanding the interests of many. For readers of this Journal the activity of the Anglo-Catholic movement in the sphere of social reform and service should be an additional reason for interest and study of such a book as this is.

ALFRED E. GARVIE.

THE DIFFUSION OF CULTURE. By G. Elliot Smith. *Watts & Co.*, 1933. 7s. 6d.

Professor Elliot Smith and Dr. Perry have gained a place in the history of anthropology by the courage, perhaps rashness, with which they have stated their convictions. They have been subjected to ridicule from all sides, and the attacks on them and their no less vigorous defence—Dr. Elliot Smith's controversial style has all the vigour of Huxley's—have obscured the two main questions that arise from their researches. To what extent are their facts reliable and have they succeeded in creating a satisfactory technique for reconstructing historical events where no historical evidences of the usual type exist? They have been accused of using data which is unreliable, a fate that has befallen many other writers who have had to depend on the observations and inferences of others. Inaccuracies are inevitable in works of this kind and occur in all the great classics of anthropology. I make no attempt to assess the value of the ethnological evidences cited in this book nor the accuracy of the many maps which illustrate it, since I have no specialized knowledge of the areas dealt with. All that I attempt is a review of the author's opinions.

Dr. Elliot Smith's critics have accused him of simplifying the process of diffusion to mechanical transmission of objects and ideas. He vigorously denies this accusation:

"The diffusion of culture is not a mere mechanical process such as the simple exchange of material objects. It is a vital process involving the unpredictable behaviour of the human beings who are the transmitters and those who are the receivers of the borrowed and inevitably modified elements of culture. Of the ideas and information submitted to any individual only parts are adopted: the choice is determined by the personal feelings and circumstances of the receiver. Moreover, the borrowed ideas become integrated into the receiver's personality and

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more or less modified in the process of adaptation to his knowledge and interests. Such selection and transformation occur in all diffusion of culture not only from one individual to another, but even more profoundly in the passage from one community to another. The vehicles of transmission are affective human beings, and subtle changes are introduced into every cultural exchange in accordance with their personal likes and dislikes, no less than their ability and understanding and the circumstances at particular moments." (p. 10.)

He illustrates the complex modifications which culture undergoes, and causes, during its spread, from the familiar and remarkable progress of Islam. He points out that he might equally have taken his illustration from the spread of Christianity or Buddhism (he gives a condensed history of the spread of Buddhism on pp. 99-108) or Mithraism, and rightly stresses that the spread of a religion does not mean only the spread of doctrines and rites, for these carry with them so many cultural accretions that it may more correctly be considered the spread of a civilization. The short history of Islam to which we are treated serves as an introduction to the whole Diffusionist argument. Science reasons from the known to the unknown. In historical times we can prove easily that the similarity between arbitrary elements of culture, widely separated in space, is due to their diffusion from a common centre. Therefore ought we not to account for like distributions by the same mechanism when we have no written records to guide us? To Dr. Elliot Smith it is clear that this is what we ought to do and he finds it difficult to understand why what is evident to him is not equally apparent to his colleagues. To him the history of the problem has been the history of a long struggle between the evidences of science and the errors of received opinion.

The history of this conflict can be most vividly traced in the successive efforts to explain the Pre-Columbian civilization of America. With typical boldness, Dr. Elliot Smith chooses to defend his Diffusionist views where at first sight spacial difficulties appear most formidable. It seems that the first academic protest against acceptance of a foreign origin of Pre-Columbian civilization came from Dr. William Robertson (*The History of America*, 1777). He attributed cultural similarities to the similar working of the human mind under like circumstances, and while he was prepared to admit a case for "usages of arbitrary institution" he considered these in the present instance to be "so few and so equivocal" that "no theory concerning the population of the New World ought to be founded upon them." In his writings we already find the usual arguments against acceptance of cultural influences from outside America, such as the difficulty of people reaching so distant a continent, the absence of many arts which one might expect to have been borrowed from immigrants, and the absence of domesticated animals. Dr. Elliot Smith answers these objections.

Though the views of other writers are discussed, Dr. Elliot Smith gives chief attention to those of Prescott and Tylor to show the changes in scientific opinion during a century following Robertson. Prescott (*The Conquest of Mexico*, 1843, and *The Conquest of Peru*, 1847) considered

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the evidence of extra-American cultural influences inconclusive. He was struck with striking similarities between religious rites, methods of disposing of the dead, methods of reckoning time, and architecture, in the Old World and in the New World. These certainly must be considered as "arbitrary peculiarities" as he called Robertson's "usages of arbitrary institution." Nevertheless he found that the absence of various arts, especially milking and iron-working in a country containing bison and surface iron, weighed heavily in the balance against the Diffusionist theory. In the absence of conclusive evidence he refused to make up his mind one way or the other, though he was prepared to admit the probability of Eastern Asiatic influences. From Dr. Elliot Smith's point of view, therefore, his book marks a distinct advance on that of Robertson.

Tylor (*Early History of Mankind*, 1865, and *Primitive Culture*, 1871) was a thorough-going Diffusionist up to the time when he allowed himself to be led astray by pseudo-psychological notions about primitive religion. I think that Dr. Elliot Smith is rather hard on Tylor. He takes the view that whereas the illogical Robertson sinned in the dark and the inconsistent Prescott "weakly accepted the voice of authority," Tylor deliberately recanted the faith of a lifetime in order to follow a will-o'-the-wisp speculation about how the human mind is always likely to work in the same way and therefore reach similar conclusions with regard to the existence of souls, animism of nature, survival after death, and so on. Tylor was quite prepared to trace the spread of folk-tales, games, types of ornament, architectural symbolisms, arts and crafts of various kinds, myths, and so on, and readily admitted Asiatic influences in America, but he did not use the same historical method when he came to examine religious beliefs. He considered that animistic beliefs arise independently wherever men exist, since they are products of subjective experiences common to all men at all times. Dr. Elliot Smith attributes this inconsistency in Tylor's thought which enabled him to maintain "throughout thirty years of his life the case for the diffusion of culture at the same time that he was the leading exponent of the diametrically opposite interpretation of human action which is commonly called the independent development of culture" (p. 174) to religious bias due to upbringing and contemporary social environment.

Whether we regard Tylor's Diffusionist and Animist theories as contradictory depends on our interpretation of the word "arbitrary," a word much used by all these writers. If a custom found in two parts of the world is "arbitrary," then this is proof of diffusion. If, on the other hand, the custom is *not* "arbitrary," it may be regarded as independently developed. Tylor considered such cultural facts as games as "arbitrary," but belief in a future life as *not* arbitrary. Dr. Elliot Smith appears to regard as "arbitrary" all culture, that is to say all behaviour which is not of a purely biological order.

Thus totemism is to Dr. Elliot Smith, as he shows in his final chapter, one of a number of "inexplicable eccentricities of archaic speculation." In this chapter his survey of the Diffusion controversy starting with Robertson's book is brought down to the works of Dr. Perry and himself (particularly his *Migrations of Early Culture*, 1911, and *Human History*, 1930,

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and Dr. Perry's *Growth of Civilization*, 1923, and *Children of the Sun*, 1926). Here he states once more, clearly and unreservedly, his three theses, that the history of civilization has not been the history of identical psychological processes, but has been the history of cultural diffusion and that this accounts for its uniformity; that Pre-Columbian civilization in America is a particular instance of such diffusion, being derived from Asiatic sources; and finally that the foundations of civilization were laid in Egypt as a result of special environmental and historical conditions obtaining in that country. The first thesis is summed up on p. 186-7:

"... There is no innate impulse in man to create either the material or the spiritual ingredients of civilization. It is an artificial system shaped by a host of peculiar circumstances acting in close co-operation in one particular place."

The second thesis is summed up on p. 204-5:

"The evidence seems to me to point clearly to the inference that the civilization of America came suddenly and in a fully developed form. It was not evolved in America, as Wissler and Spinden assume, but its germs were planted in Central America by immigrants who brought across the Pacific the high culture then flourishing in Cambodia and Java; and further that these immigrants settled in particular localities, not because either the climate or the country was comfortable or conducive to intellectual achievement, but because they found in those places the particular objects of their search, pearls and gold, precious stones and copper, to all of which they attached an arbitrary and magical value which had been created by certain historical events in the Old World."

The last sentence of this quotation foreshadows Dr. Elliot Smith's third proposition, that civilization began in Egypt. The importance of diffusion in cultural development, largely owing to Dr. Elliot Smith, is more readily recognised than it was. Even the Asiatic origin of Pre-Columbian civilization has gained adherents. But almost all ethnologists grow cold at the thought of Dr. Elliot Smith's final conclusion:

"What we do claim is that when, after hundreds of thousands of years of inertia, men at last began to build up civilization, the process was begun by the inhabitants of Egypt, who by inventing the practice of agriculture started the process of making a civilized state. They created the needs and the ideas which provoked men to go on devising new inventions" (p. 217).

E. E. EVANS-PRITCHARD.

LA CRISI DEL CAPITALISMO. G. Pirou, W. Sombart, E. F. M. Durbin, E. M. Patterson, U. Spirito. Appendice bibliografica di G. Bruguier. G. C. Sansoni, Firenze, 1933.

This book is the first publication of the new economic department of the Scuola di scienze corporative at Pisa. It is, as Giuseppe Bottai explains in his preface, the beginning of an attempt to unravel the complexities of the post-war economic situation and to discover a firm founda-

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tion for future action. The task set the various authors was to describe the state of opinion in their own country, rather than to offer a solution of the pressing problems of the day. The resulting picture is, the editor submits, one of confusion amid which the Italian conception of the corporative State stands out as the one brilliant exception, the only experiment which offers any hope of permanent success. The contrast between confusion and clarity is evident, since other countries speak with many voices, and Italy with one, but the claim that the corporative principle is solving the economic problems of the moment is less easily granted. Professor Spirito speaks in terms of theory rather than of practice. He claims that, whereas "socialismo di Stato" merely achieves a compromise between individualism and capitalism by giving each its separate sphere, the corporative principle achieves a fusion, being a planned economy based on a qualitative appreciation of the individual. But this really explains what the Italians *want* the system to do rather than what it *does* do, and leaves many practical questions unanswered.

Professor Sombart gives a shrewd analysis of the German character in order to explain why no clear body of economic thought has emerged as a political force, and then outlines a scheme for planning on the lines described by Professor Spirito as "socialismo di Stato." Recent events in Germany, though not clearly foreseen by him, are consistent with his account of the situation. Professor Patterson, on the other hand, describes a society quite unprepared for the developments which have in fact followed since he wrote. "Planning" is dismissed in half a page. The bulk of the article deals with various monetary schemes, methods of indirect inflation and tariff policies, and the economists are declared to be, on the whole, opposed both to inflation and to any movement towards economic nationalism.

Professor Pirou and Mr. Durbin give the most thorough and systematic pictures of economic thought in their respective countries. They show the wide range of critical opinion and the general dissatisfaction with capitalism in its contemporary form. Mr. Durbin not only gives an illuminating study of English public opinion, but goes more deeply into the essential nature of the rival schools of economic thought than does any of the other writers. There is a most useful bibliography of forty-five pages.

T. H. MARSHALL.

CONTEMPORARY LITERATURE AND SOCIAL REVOLUTION.

By R. D. Charques. London: *Martin Secker*, 1933. 6s.

This is a book worth reading because it is well written and contains many illuminating obiter dicta in literary criticism. But Mr. Charques does not succeed in establishing a thesis or even in making it quite clear

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what thesis he wishes to establish. He passes in review contemporary poetry, fiction, and drama, showing that in each of these can be seen the influence of a bourgeois ideology. He seems at first to be blaming our writers for ignoring the social problems of the day. Later he is rather inclined to maintain that they do not ignore them, since their conception of their art is a product of the class struggle. His analysis of the way the consciousness of this conflict and the attempt to escape from it expresses itself not only in the themes but in the forms of literature is the most interesting part of the study. "The cult of individuality, the doctrine of self-expression, the principle of pure art—these are the protean forms of the ideal bourgeois culture." But it is never quite clear how far he subscribes to the Marxist doctrine of historical materialism, nor how he accounts for the striking exceptional cases, nor how he explains the fact that bourgeois art is a success with the proletariat. He has not, in fact, a clear enough understanding of the problems which confront the student of "Wissenssoziologie."

T. H. MARSHALL.

AN INDUSTRIAL SURVEY OF CUMBERLAND AND FURNESS.

By John Jewkes and Allan Winterbottom. *Manchester University Press*, 1933. 8s. 6d.

This volume is a pendant to the four reports on depressed areas, prepared by universities at the request of the Board of Trade. It gives the results of an enquiry made by the Research Section of the Department of Economics and Commerce of Manchester University at the request of local Employment Committees in West Cumberland. The area covered was Cumberland, excluding Carlisle, and the Furness district of Lancashire, a comparatively small industrial region with a total population of about a quarter of a million. In view of the non-official nature of the enquiry the authors felt free to speculate about the probable future of the area and to discuss some general problems of industrialized society which this area illustrates; both of these they have done very profitably. The authors have amassed a great deal of information, but they have not allowed themselves to be overwhelmed by it, and their main arguments are clear and cogent.

The pre-war prosperity of West Cumberland was unstable, just as the pre-war prosperity of greater industrial areas has been shown in the light of experience to have been unstable. It was based mainly on iron and steel production. Its peculiar asset was for many years the existence of non-phosphoric hæmatite ore. Many of the mines are now worked out; and unless new rich finds occur, the supply will be exhausted in two or three decades. Moreover, improvements in technical processes have

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lessened the advantage of this ore over phosphoric ores. The coal mines which had as their first market the iron and steel works, exported largely to the Irish Free State, and the tariff war has hit them hard.

The authors of this report state plainly and with few qualifications that they can see little hope of a better industrial future for the area, that the likelihood is greater that it will continue to decline. They have done well to be so explicit ; the abandonment of false hope is an indispensable preliminary to coming to grips with the problems which have to be faced ; and anyone who has had to do with a depressed area will know how hard, naturally enough, it is for the inhabitants to realize their new situation.

Various possibilities are examined : the hydrogenation of coal, the establishment of manufactures for the home market, the development of agriculture. The chances do not seem to be good in any of these directions : the smallness of the population and the remoteness of the area from the great home markets are an insuperable handicap. With regard to transference of population to other parts of the country, the Cumbrian miner would seem to be an even more difficult person to move than the miner of other depressed areas. Yet, on the whole, migration is the least unpromising avenue for further exploration. On the technique of it the authors have some interesting things to say.

The report on Barrow-in-Furness and its neighbourhood is more cheerful ; here a great industry has adapted itself to new circumstances with marked success : commercial shipbuilding has taken the place of naval shipbuilding. But Barrow has all the insecurity of a one-firm town.

Some large general questions are raised and discussed by the authors. They point out the very unsatisfactory rôle of the State at present in relation to the rise and fall of industrial communities. Roughly speaking, the State is not expected to interfere during the period when development is taking place, but it is expected to come to the rescue and to deal with the aftermath when the prosperity of the industry has passed. Quite clearly it would be equitable, if it should prove feasible, to levy a fund on the industry during its happy days to provide for the salvaging and restoration, both of land and of men, which will need to be done later on. At the present moment a new iron and steel industry is developing in Northamptonshire ; and precisely now at this time of inception the community should be thinking of the time, which will assuredly come, when this new industry also will have run its term, and when the community which it is bringing into existence will be left without function or resources.

The authors also discuss the very difficult problems which local authorities have to face in a declining area ; it is no demerit of theirs if they indicate questions rather than supply answers ; the subject is one which has as yet been very little explored.

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Altogether this volume is a notable addition to the literature of surveys it supplies the necessary data, it is luminous in interpretation, and it shows the local and contemporary situation against a wider background.

HENRY A. MESS.

THE END OF OUR TIME. By Nicholas Berdyaev. Sheed & Ward, 1933. 6s.

When Mr. Aldous Huxley prefaced a recent work with a quotation from Berdyaev, at least one of the latter's admirers rubbed his hands. The English reader was at least receiving from a connoisseur an authoritative recommendation to an original and independent thinker, whose range and insight place him at the height of contemporary culture. We now have accessible a volume of five essays. The title is a little unfortunate, since Berdyaev is keenly aware of living in an age of transition towards a future which he goes out to meet and to greet. "The very substance of my philosophy," he says, "is to have nothing at all to do with the thought of times, which, so far as I am concerned, are over and done with; I look to the thought of a world which is to begin. . . ."

The reader will not find here a full statement of Berdyaev's philosophy; this is to be found in *The Philosophy of the Free Spirit* (translated into French under the title *Esprit et Liberté*) and *The Destination of Man* (Paris, 1931, in Russian). But the present volume of essays is fully representative and is sufficient to illustrate his passion for creative freedom. It also is evidence of his struggle to express his meaning and enclose the vastness of his thought within the limits of words; for Berdyaev speaks better than he writes. He is to be numbered among the sons of the prophets and his message does not come easily. When it does come, it is in a series of aphorisms which lend themselves to quotation, but less to consecutive reading. His spiritual ancestors were not in Greece but Judæa.

This is most of all apparent in the opening essay, *The End of the Renaissance*, which the reader, who is already impatient of the past (and who is not?) will find a little long. It is necessary, however, to clear the ground and to know to what of past achievement the author concedes survival-value. Certain of his ideas on this subject are further developed in the later essay, *Democracy, Socialism, and Theocracy*. He is equally dissatisfied with the two former and seeks no return to the past failures of the latter. The dialectical strain of his reasoning is to be seen in his preference for theonomy. But the two best essays are *The New Middle Ages* and *The Russian Revolution*. They are works of talent in their triumph over personal catastrophe and disillusionment, in an ability to profit by a lesson shrewdly interpreted, and in the courage with which the author confronts the "dark immensity." "We are men of the middle ages, not only

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because that is our destiny, but also because we will it ; *you* are still men of modern times, because you refuse to choose."

The final essay, *The "General Line" of Soviet Philosophy*, is an appropriate and amusing treatment of the subject.

The publisher and the translator are to be congratulated on their enterprise, the reader on his opportunity. Berdyaev can speak with authority where most of us can only guess ; he is at one with us because we also wish to see all things made new.

A. F. DOBBIE-BATEMAN.

CHRISTIANITY AND CLASS WAR. By Nicholas Berdyaev.
Translated by Donald Attwater. *Sheed & Ward.* 3s. 6d.

Dedicated by the author, a member of the Eastern Orthodox Church, to the memory of Karl Marx, "who was the social master of my youth and whose opponent in ideas I have become," this book is singularly free from the bitterness which often characterizes the writings of those who rebel against the ideas in which they have been nurtured and awakened to a realization of the mischief which, they believe, is being wrought by those ideas. In rebelling against the doctrine of the class war, as preached by Marx and his followers, M. Berdyaev has retained a profound respect for Marx as analytical economist and as champion of the poor. What he sees clearly, however, and expounds with admirable clarity and force, is that Marx's "proletarian theory was not scientific but religious, messianic, mythical ; he created the myth of the messiah-proletariat, the elect people of God, saviours of mankind, endowed with every virtue. This myth belongs to a very different plane from that on which the empirical class war is actually carried on."

M. Berdyaev's exposition of the folly of attempting to cast out the devil of capitalistic materialism by the devil of communistic materialism is an able and convincing piece of work. He shows that the one has adopted the false values of the other, and that both derive from the odious bourgeois spirit which the Marxians imagine they have escaped. To both he opposes the ethical and spiritual values of Christianity, with its emphasis on the sacredness of human personality and its repudiation of the idea that brotherhood can be made to grow from hate. The compulsory submergence of the individual in the collectivized State he sees as a horrible caricature of the Christian ideal of free devotion to the common weal.

When it comes to the question of what the church should do in the actual world of capitalistic exploitation, he is not so definite and constructive as one could wish. His hopes for a new aristocracy of an intel-

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lectual and spiritual kind do not carry us very far. He frankly says : " A very grave responsibility rests with us Christians. Our times call for speech that is charged with freshness, youthful vigour, creative energy—and we have not yet found it." Nevertheless, the chapters on the duty of the church to stop talking platitudes and make a real contribution to the solution of the social problems of the modern commercial age are challenging and penetrating. The book is the work of one who has honestly faced up to the reality of class antagonism and who sees the imperative need of ending it without resorting to the desperate folly of trying to do so by the class-war plan of intensifying it. One wonders how many in the two Russian camps have " ears to hear."

A. J. WALDEGRAVE.

FROM PLAN TO REALITY. By the Staff of the Regional Plan Association, Inc. of New York.

New York and its neighbourhood are struggling to bring order out of chaos with a little success, as this report proves. No area in the world could be of more interest to town planners, for it suffers from all the vices (or is it virtues?) of our mechanized civilization. It has centralization ; it has congestion ; it has the motor-car ; it has slums or, as they prefer to call them, " blighted areas " ; it suffers from excessive land values and of course from land speculation : and on top of it all descended the slump.

In turning over the pages of this volume it is possible to gauge the progress, much of it ahead of schedule, which has been made towards the realization of the comprehensive plan drawn up some years ago by the Regional Plan Association, under the guidance of an Englishman, Thomas Adams. Emphasis has been laid in this report on the educational value of the plan itself and of the original volumes of the survey. Public opinion has been roused and taught to look with favour on the general scheme and now, through the local authorities, helps to carry out the suggestions as they become practicable. This is how a plan should function. First there must be the careful survey, on which the general plan is based. The general public should be taught to understand the scheme, should be given, in fact, a regional sense. The local authorities may then carry out their special detailed plans in accordance with the general advisory scheme. It is a good thing to draw up a schedule of " urgencies," that is, of projects in the order of their urgency, so that time is saved, and the more important difficulties tackled first.

In all modern planning the utility and design of highways is of the utmost importance. Traffic must flow freely in our swift-moving life. Planners are beginning to study the question of specialized roadways, such as freight-ways for heavy through traffic ; parkways ; speedways,

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and so on. One of the most useful suggestions in this report is for freightways supported by tolls, specially constructed for heavy through haulage traffic. If this were carried out on a bold scale between the large centres of population, the public roadways would be saved wear and tear, and the levy of a toll would go some way to redress the grievance of the railways that the road traffic has its "permanent" way supplied free by the public. The whole important question of roads and traffic is treated ably and at considerable length in the volume under review.

The question of parks, again, exercises the minds of town planners and social reformers, and here too specialization of function is becoming a necessity. Recreation grounds for children; scenic parks; zoological gardens; game parks for cricket, hockey, and football; golf courses, are a few of the requirements of the urban population to-day.

A study of the New York area exposes the artificial organization (or concentration?) of the modern centralized populations. It is only by constant planning and careful forethought that they can be kept from disaster. Take for instance the fine photograph on p. 89 of a modern sewage-disposal plant with a raised railroad in the foreground curving up to the bridge level to cross the wide river; it is a magnificent composition in modern materials and illustrates one tiny fragment of public service vital to the townsman. Or take the clover-leaf intersection illustrated on p. 41 where two important highways meet: here we have a second example of the expensive provision which has to be made by the modern community to enable it to carry on its complex method of life. In the light of this it is comforting to read in chapter VIII of the provision being made, both by legislation and by unofficial citizen groups, for the extension of planning and the continuous development of the region on proper lines, and on p. 127 of the plan for a sound scheme of development on broad lines to be mapped out and given official sanction in all areas not actually in process of development. This is of great importance and fundamental to all planning, and, if carried out faithfully, will prevent the great future expense of redressing the wrongs done in the name of unhampered "development."

Indeed, this report is an epitome of up-to-date planning, and is worthy of study by all those students who desire to learn the practical problem of the organization of the great modern city.

G. G. CLARK.

660 RUNAWAY BOYS. By Clairette P. Armstrong. *Gorham Press, Boston, 1932.* \$3.00.

The subject of escape and wandering has been one of fascinating speculation for those with a thirst for romance, as well as for the scientific

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adventurer. The fugitive and the rebel from social custom must rank high in the aristocracy of best sellers. It is perhaps partly due to the conflict between the delights of vicarious experience and recognition of the extravagance of social disorder that the problems of the tramp, the itinerant family, and the truant child have always provided us with social dilemmas of a particularly baffling kind.

If we accept the findings of Dr. Armstrong's study of New York boys, we shall have to abandon romantic delusions about the runaway child. The motive of adventure and exploration, or any inner drive which could be attributable mainly to inherent "wanderlust," is apparently so infrequent as to be almost discounted among the complexity of causes. On the whole, the boy who shakes the dust of the home from his feet and takes to the unfriendly shelter of the alley, the subway or the empty house, is not a vigorous youngster with a zest for adventure. He is generally a child of dull intelligence, misplaced in school, handicapped by poor physical health and nervous symptoms, escaping from a home in which the damaging forces of cruelty, conflict, neurosis, and neglect are more than is usually evident, even in the homes of other delinquents.

Dr. Armstrong bases her findings upon a series of cases referred for special examination to the psychiatric and psychological clinic attached to the New York Children's Court. Children who come before the Court on account of neglect are ruled out, but the running-away episode may have been incidental to other offences. As controls for the study of this particular social symptom, two other groups are used from the same Court: boys charged with "Unlawful Entry," and those who have been complained against by their parents as being "Incorrigible" and "Beyond Control." For the further isolation of certain characteristics, such as intellectual ability, educational standard, the nationality and marital status of parents, and housing conditions, there are figures quoted from one or more of the elementary schools of the city. The boys' own accounts of their motives are given separate consideration, and one chapter contains a series of brief illustrative histories.

The book bears the marks of a study undertaken as incidental to the diagnostic function of a clinic attached to the Court. The group itself is of course doubly selected from the standpoint of the behaviour symptom: (a) by the fact of appearance in Court, and (b) by the reference of the children to the clinic—a reference presumably determined by the judgment of the Court that there is some special psychological difficulty. The control groups of other types of delinquents are too small for convincing evidence, and the figures available from the general school population and from other sources are sometimes acknowledged as invalid samples, and are often not available at all. This constitutes a

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particular difficulty in the chapters dealing with "Family Pathology" and "Nervous Habits." We have very little knowledge of the incidence of these handicaps in the general population.

Stress is laid primarily upon social situations in the home which are psychologically damaging, but individual instances are recognised as being the product of many converging forces, of which one of the most significant is misplacement at school, due to the over-rigidity of educational methods. Here readers in this country will find common ground in our own urgent problem of the backward child—a problem, incidentally, which figures heavily in the lists of symptoms for which children are referred to child-guidance clinics.

The reader is helped by plentiful tables and summaries, but a useful study might have been made more readable by careful literary editing.

S. CLEMENT BROWN.

WHAT WE PUT IN PRISON. By G. W. Pailthorpe. *Williams & Norgate, Ltd.*, 1932. 5s. net.

Dr. Pailthorpe has the permission of the Prison Commissioners to print this book, though it does not necessarily follow that they agree with her in every respect. The book embodies the results of years of research into prison cases of women offenders by a highly trained medical woman whose experience is both specialized and wide.

What is crime? Who are criminals? Dr. Pailthorpe refuses to believe that criminals are a class apart or that crime is unknown to those outside prison. While it is true legally and in current opinion that a man is not a criminal until the arm of the law is stretched out to take him, it is equally true that a large percentage of the population at large is criminal in a deeper moral and social sense. Indeed, Dr. Pailthorpe finds that the urge for primitive methods in penal "reformers" arises not so much from a desire to cure the offender as to punish something in themselves for which a scapegoat is necessary.

Careful investigation into the psychology of delinquency reveals invariably some form of maladjustment which if remedied would turn the distorted into a normal member of society. Some distortions may not be remediable, but the twenty case histories given in detail show a logical reason for each example of "naughtiness."

If by knowledge of causation crime may prove curable, our attitude to the criminal and the whole structure of our penal system must be radically changed. "Co-operation between doctor and patient in the case of bodily sickness is half the battle. In psychological cases this is even more important. It follows that there is an enormous field for

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profitable experiment in this direction and that the study of this will lead us inevitably to a consideration of the unconscious motives at work behind all crime."

D. PRICE.

L'ÉVOLUTION DES BESOINS DANS LES CLASSES OUVRIÈRES.

By Maurice Halbwachs, *Paris*, 1933.

This is an elaborate study by the Professor of Economics in the University of Strasburg of the results obtainable from a study of such family budgets as have been secured in Germany, America and France. It contains a great quantity of statistical information with regard to the distribution of available spending power on food, clothing, lodging and less urgent wants. Broadly speaking, what M. Halbwachs has achieved is to put in more precise form, and to state quantitatively, the changes in popular demand with which observers have been familiar. But his general conclusion is of interest. It is that while working-class consumption naturally increases when there is a brisk demand for labour, and is reduced in bad times, the resistance to any lowering of the standard of living is so great that the general movement is upwards.

G. SLATER.

PARLIAMENTARY OPINION OF DELEGATED LEGISLATION.

By C. M. Chen. *Columbia University Press*, 1933. \$2.25.

This well-documented book discusses the attitude of parliamentarians to the encroachments by the executive on the powers of the legislature in the last hundred years of government in Britain. The century falls into three periods. The first, from 1832 to 1906, when Parliament was confident of its own "omnipotence and omnicompetence" and the dangers of delegated legislation were unknown to the average member. In the 2nd period, 1906-1914, the executive took extensive and drastic powers, which called forth vigorous attack. Criticism slumbered during the war and its D.O.R.A., but in the third, the post-war period, Parliament became increasingly jealous of its powers. It was, however, too late. Congestion of business and the increased stringency of party loyalty left little opportunity to the individual critic. The development has seemed to be inevitable, acquiesced in after criticism by the critics themselves. The author discusses its justification and the safeguards demanded. The "Watchdogs of the Constitution" have been found in all parties, but the process has gone on whichever party has held office.

J. E. D.

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THE SCIENCE OF PEACE. By Lord Raglan. *Methuen*, 1933. 3s. 6d.

The author believes man to be not by nature pugnacious. But that if he were, this would throw no light on the origin of war. He believes primitive man is not warlike, but apparently this does not apply to primitive woman. "Apart from their activities in urging the men on to fight, murdering the wounded and torturing the prisoners, for all of which savage women in many parts of the world are notorious, it is, or was, by no means rare for women to take an active part in warfare themselves." The root cause of war is Nationalism, to which his objection is thorough. A nation is "neither more nor less than a body of people organized for war." His solution is Imperialism. "The ideal solution seems to me to be the division of the world into half a dozen great empires, each of which should occupy a large area in each Continent." This being so, it is hardly surprising to find here little sympathy with democracy. Thus, "It is, I think, probable that the whole world would be much better governed if nobody were allowed any share in the government of his own country or tribe." "There may be some distinction between a militant suffragette fighting for woman's rights, and a militant Japanese fighting for Manchukuo, but I do not know what it is." Readers who wish for further knowledge of the Science of Peace must be referred to the book.

J. E. D.

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 Colbourne (Maurice). ECONOMIC NATIONALISM. Figurehead. 3s. 6d.
 Davies (D. J.). THE ECONOMIC HISTORY OF SOUTH WALES PRIOR TO 1800. University of Wales. 8s. 6d.
 Davis (J. Merle). MODERN INDUSTRY AND THE AFRICAN. Macmillan. 12s. 6d.
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 Perry (C. A.). THE REBUILDING OF BLIGHTED AREAS. Regional Plan.
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ARCHIVES DE SOCIOLOGIE	July, Dec. 1933
ARCHIVIO DI STUDI CORPORATIVI	Vol. IV
ARHIVA	Vol. XI 1-4 Index
ASIATIC REVIEW	Jan.
BRITISH JOURNAL OF EDUCATIONAL PSYCHOLOGY	Feb.
CHARACTER AND PERSONALITY	Dec.
CHARITY ORGANISATION SOCIETY QUARTERLY	Jan.
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ECONOMIC JOURNAL	Dec., March
ECONOMICA	Nov.
EUGENICS REVIEW	Jan.
GEOGRAPHICAL REVIEW	Jan.
GEOGRAPHY	Dec., March
HEADWAY	Dec., Jan., Feb., March
HIGHWAY	Dec., Jan., Feb., March
HINDUSTAN REVIEW	Oct.
INDIAN MAGAZINE	Nov.-Dec.
INFORMATION BULLETIN OF THE INSTITUTE OF INTELLECTUAL CO-OPERATION	
	Vol. I., 13-14, 15-16
INTERNATIONAL CONCILIATION	Dec., Jan.
INTERNATIONAL LABOUR REVIEW	Dec., Jan., Feb.
INTERNATIONAL REVIEW OF AGRICULTURE	Nov., Dec.
ISLAMIC REVIEW	Dec., Jan.-Feb.
JOURNAL OF HEREDITY	Oct., Nov., Dec.
JOURNAL OF THE LONDON SOCIETY	Jan., Feb., March
JOURNAL OF NEGRO HISTORY	Jan.
KENT EDUCATION GAZETTE	Jan., Feb., March
KYOTO UNIVERSITY ECONOMIC REVIEW	Dec.
LABOUR MANAGEMENT	Feb.
LECTURE RECORDER	Dec., Jan., Feb., March
MAN	Jan., Feb., March
MILLGATE MONTHLY	Jan., Feb., March
MONIST	Jan.
MUSÉE SOCIAL	Nov., Dec., Jan.
NUOVI STUDI	Sept.-Oct., Nov.-Dec.
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PLAYING FIELDS	Jan.
PLUS LOIN	Dec., Jan., Feb.
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REVUE DES ETUDES CO-OPÉRATIVES	Oct.-Dec.
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